The most general thing that might be done with Syria has to do with the development of the Army of the Middle Temperament, which General Idris possibly represented. The reality is it’s not going very well, and the deeply fragmented character of revolutionary forces (anti-Assad) may be additionally hampered by anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, anti-western thought . . . in short a whole complex of attitudes and beliefs that having made clear what the revolution is against — i.e., the Assad dictatorship and the horror it has brought to Syria, and the entire free world is against that (by reduction: the kleptocratic Putin-Assad-Khamenei art of power) — it may be having a more difficult time articulating what it is FOR.

Perhaps much of the twisting nature of the conflict may be approached in terms of the divide or split between traditional loyalties, including that implied by Arab pan-nationalism, and dawning principles about mankind. It takes a lot of work on the inside to become coherent about what the revolution is fighting for. The extremists have a ready-made program, or believe they day, but they are of the same malignantly narcissist personality as the Assad regime.

The reader may imagine the prompt for the comment.

Of course, what is happening to Syria and the Syrian People in their totality has to stop.

Getting power to the people, however, proves just about impossible given 1) the fragmentation of the revolution, 2) the requirement that a revolution must be fought FOR the installation of better ideas and healthier people as well as against a tyrannical presence, and then 3) in the less than perfect world, with good relationships forged atop strong foundations, the kind of commitment to common cause sorely compromised by the self-defeating habit of a heady contempt and enmity for others who might have been more helpful otherwise.

# # #