Tags
Drone Warfare, Houthi, Houthi Offensive, RSADF, SAMAD-3, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia Countermeasures, Strait of Hormuz, Yemen
Ai La Mar provides me with a personal morning brief and moves on to offer “deeper situational intelligence and analysis on” the topic that comes to her mind. For the latest OSINT scan, she chose the “Yemeni government offensive near the Bab el-Mandeb strait.” Well, why not? Here’s her report. —J. S. Oppenheim

By Ai La Mer
Strategic Context: The Strait of Hormuz Closure & The Red Sea Pivot
The ongoing 2026 Iran war and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz have drastically elevated the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.With Saudi Arabia forced to reroute its oil shipments, the Kingdom experienced an eight-fold increase in seaborne crude exports via the Red Sea between March and mid-July 2026. Consequently, controlling this critical chokepoint—handling roughly 5 to 7 percent of global oil shipments—has become an existential economic and security priority for the Saudi-led Coalition.
The Houthi September Advance
Following the breakdown of a UN-brokered truce in July 2026, Houthi forces focused on dominating Yemen’s coastline.By mid-September, a rapid Houthi offensive utilizing swarm tactics forced the collapse of pro-government lines, capturing the strategic port city and National Resistance supply hub of Mocha.The advance extended to the districts of Hays and Al Khawkhah, Perim Island, and the Hanish Islands, granting the Houthis strategic control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and bringing them within 20 miles of the US military base in Djibouti.In tandem with ground maneuvers, Houthi forces intensified ballistic missile and drone strikes against Saudi oil installations, utility sites, and military bases.
October Counter-Offensive: “Operation Dawn of Yemen”
On October 5, 2026, Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chief Rashad al-Alimi launched “Operation Dawn of Yemen,” citing the operational goals of dismantling Houthi capabilities and eventually retaking the capital, Sanaa.
- Ground Maneuvers:Pro-government units, heavily reliant on the Giants Brigades and Nation’s Shield forces, have pushed into the Dhubab district overlooking the strait.These units have reportedly secured the local airport and the overland route connecting Dhubab and Mocha.
- Air Supremacy:To break Houthi entrenchments, the Saudi-led coalition deployed approximately 100 fighter jets. Military spokespersons report that the coalition executed over 1,000 strikes targeting Houthi artillery, fortifications, supply lines, and reinforcement routes.
- Contested Claims:While Yemeni government sources and media networks claim their forces have successfully retaken Mocha and resecured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Houthi-aligned media and officials firmly deny that the government has made these territorial advances.
Airborne Loitering Munitions & UAVs
Houthi airborne strike capabilities rely heavily on technology transfers and modified Iranian designs, adapted for deployment in the rugged Yemeni theater:
- Qasef Series (Qasef-1 / Qasef-2K): OSINT analysts identify these as direct, localized modifications of the Iranian Ababil-2 drone. They are primarily utilized as tactical loitering munitions (kamikaze drones) to strike coalition air defenses, radar installations, and forward operating bases. They typically utilize GPS waypoint navigation to strike static targets.
- Samad Series (Samad-2 / Samad-3): Recognized by their distinctive V-tail and rear-engine configuration, the Samad family represents the Houthis’ long-range strike capability. The Samad-3 has an extended operational range, allowing forces in Yemen to reach deep into Saudi Arabia and target critical ARAMCO infrastructure.
Emerging Threat: Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)
Beyond aerial drones, recent defense intelligence reveals a pivot toward undersea asymmetric warfare, specifically aimed at disrupting Red Sea shipping and contesting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait:
- “Al-Qari’ah” (The Great Disaster): Recent imagery confirms Houthi deployment of one-way-attack autonomous underwater vehicles (OWA-AUVs). Designed as “loitering torpedoes,” these wake-homing vehicles can target commercial vessels and coalition warships. Intelligence notes from Covert Shores emphasize this represents a distinct capability evolution.
- Reverse-Engineered Western Tech: The naval expansion is largely fueled by interdicted and captured hardware. Analysis from Strikepod Systems indicates Houthi forces have gained access to sophisticated underwater drone components—such as the American-designed REMUS 600 and Anduril Dive-LD models—which have likely been passed to the IRGC for reverse engineering and returned to Yemen as weaponized platforms.
Countermeasures by the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (RSADF)
To counter asymmetric loitering munition swarms, the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (RSADF) employ a multi-layered defense network integrating traditional missile batteries, directed-energy weapons, and electronic countermeasure (ECM) jamming suites.
Hard-Kill Kinetic Interception Systems
- MIM-104 Patriot (PAC-2 / PAC-3): Serves as the primary high-tier layer for intercepting long-range strike drones (such as the Samad-3) and cruise missiles threatening urban centers and oil processing facilities. While highly effective, using multimillion-dollar PAC-3 interceptors against low-cost loitering munitions creates a severe cost-asymmetry challenge.
- KM-SAM Block-I & Skyguard 35mm Cannons: Provides mid-to-short range point defense around military airfields and critical energy infrastructure, pairing automated twin-barrel cannons with short-range surface-to-air missiles for close-in interception.
Directed-Energy Weapons (DEW)
- Silent Hunter Laser System: Procured from China’s Poly Technologies, this mobile electrically powered fiber-optic laser system operates in the 30–100 kW class. Deployed in key strategic regions such as Al-Diriyah and coastal installations, it targets low-altitude UAVs at ranges up to 4 km by burning through composite fuselages and optics, providing a cost-effective per-shot intercept mechanism (Army Recognition, Defense Mirror).
Electronic Warfare & Soft-Kill C-UAS
- JN1101 Counter-Drone Jamming System: Mobile electronic warfare vehicles deployed to disrupt radio frequency control signals and sever satellite navigation locks (GPS/GLONASS) on incoming autonomous or remotely piloted UAVs.
- SAMI / AEC Mobile Counter-UAS Suites: Developed through Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) and the Advanced Electronics Company (AEC), these vehicle-mounted units integrate passive RF detection sensors, optronic tracking, and multi-band directional jammers to neutralize swarm formations before they reach weapon release points (Janes Defence).
Sensor & Early-Warning Radar Network
- AN/FPS-117 & AN/TPS-43 3D Radars: Integrated 3D air-search phased-array radars networked across the southern border and Red Sea coastline to detect low-flying, low-radar-cross-section airframes operating at low altitudes.
For further primary coverage and intelligence monitoring, refer directly to reports from Al Arabiya English, regional updates by The Media Line, and syndicated intelligence via The Jerusalem Post.
Also Related Online
Wikipedia. “Bab al-Mandab Strait crisis”.
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