Tags
nuclear blackmail, political psychology, political science, Russian disinformation, Russian Mafia State, Ukraine v. Russia, Vladimir Putin
So far, Ukraine has not confirmed any attack on Russia’s nuclear facility in Kursk and media claims only that a shot down drone — where was it going? — caused a fire at the site. There’s a difference, of course, between an attack and a damaged aircraft falling from the sky. While the character of Russian disinformation and the “fog of war” muddy conclusions, there should be no question about Putin’s intent to leverage his nuclear “option” into some realpolitik strength in position position while every other indicator coming off the Ukraine-Russia War suggests Moscow has in fact been losing in every measurable dimension. Its oil producing capacity has been reduced by 13 percent causing prices at Russia’s pumps to skyrocket accordingly; Russian casualties since the 2022 invasion have surpassed one million; and the cost of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine appears to be producing Putin’s archaic-barbaric nation-as-fief an estimated $172 billion in expenses for 2025 (AI mentions $450 billion in total accrued costs–see verbatim text in the AI section of this post).
From the above, one may suggest that Vladimir Putin must be experiencing a bad day every day or, alternatively, enjoying a deluded day in a theater all his own–one may then wonder how his inner circle feels about that.
As noted here years ago, Putin’s fear of public humiliation and shame drives frame and maintain his own image as unassailable, courageous, and heroic — see “Why Putin Won’t Stop Until Stopped” (January 20, 2023). His problem: reality won’t accept his claims of successes — none to date have proven immune to Ukrainian drone push-back and other defensive measures — nor any denials of culpability. He embarked on the conquest of Ukraine under false premises in 2014, and while he annexed Crimea without a shot fired — and nothing more than diplomatic posturing from Washington for resistance — he’s just not getting further with anything he does. Russia’s admirals and generals may note well the fate of his once-proud Black Sea Fleet:
At the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine lacked a naval force capable of meeting the threat. What little it had didn’t last long. To prevent the Russians from capturing it, the Ukrainians scuttled their one major warship. Its other naval vessels were damaged, destroyed, or captured (“Russia’s navy looks to be stretched thin after getting battered by Ukraine and losing a key port, Western officials say” — by Jake Epstein, Business Insider, August 13, 2025).
As Putin’s fortunes and prospects continue to decline in the face of western resolve (even without the fulsome resolve of American will while the nation weathers an administration whose loyalties to the American secular democratic republic appear doubtful), he’ll strive to sustain his illusion of the absolute control of Russia through the deadly and grinding machinery of the “mafia state” that he has built around himself, a state that may fear him more than it admires or loves him.
AI Recaps, August 24, 2025
Russian Nuclear Accusations Against Ukraine
Russia’s nuclear accusations against Ukraine are primarily disinformation campaigns, such as the late 2022 claim that Ukraine was preparing to use a “dirty bomb” on Ukrainian territory. More recently, on August 24, 2025, Russia accused Ukraine of launching a drone attack on the Kursk nuclear power plant, causing a fire and minor damage to a transformer, though radiation levels remained normal and no casualties were reported. These accusations are often seen as propaganda aimed at discrediting Ukraine and justifying Russia’s actions in the ongoing conflict. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]
Accusations of a “Dirty Bomb” (October 2022) [1, 2, 9, 10]
- Russia’s claim: In late October 2022, Russia accused Ukraine of planning to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb” on Ukrainian soil and warned international partners about it, according to The New York Times.
- Ukraine’s response: Ukraine, in turn, accused Russia of secretly building dirty bombs at Europe’s largest nuclear power plant.
- International view: U.S. intelligence officials considered the claims to be a Russian tactic, possibly as a “bluff” or a way to employ its “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine.
Drone Attack on a Nuclear Plant (August 2025)
- Russia’s claim: Russia accused Ukraine of launching drone attacks, including one that struck the Kursk nuclear power plant. [3, 5]
- Damage and effects: The attack caused a fire and damaged a transformer, forcing a reduction in the power plant’s capacity. However, the fire was quickly extinguished, with no casualties and normal radiation levels reported. [4, 5]
- Ukraine’s response: Ukraine did not immediately comment, but a Ukrainian center called the accusations “typical methods” of Russian propaganda. [6]
- International reaction: The UN’s nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, was aware of the reports but had not independently confirmed them, emphasizing that all nuclear facilities must be protected. [4, 5]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/10/25/world/russia-ukraine-war-news
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_risk_during_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
[6] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czxy2v9dzgxo
[7] https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/ukraine-uses-chemical-weapons-without-control/
[8] https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/21/7508441/
Reductions in Russian Oil Refining Capacity
Note: some bolded italics added–>
Ukraine’s long-range drone attacks have significantly degraded Russia’s oil refining capacity, knocking out approximately 13% of the country’s processing capability since early August 2025, leading to elevated fuel prices and production disruptions. The attacks have targeted major refineries and infrastructure like the Druzhba pipeline, with repairs complicated by Western sanctions that restrict access to specialized equipment and prolong outages. This campaign is a strategic effort to undermine Russia’s economy and its ability to fund the war, as evidenced by the soaring wholesale gasoline prices and potential reliance on government subsidies for Russian energy firms. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Key Impacts on Russian Oil Production: [1, 2, 3]
- Reduced Refining Capacity: Around 13% of Russia’s total refining capacity has been knocked out, with estimates suggesting about 44.3 million tons of annual processing capability disrupted.
- Prolonged Outages: Major facilities like the Volgograd, Samara, and Ryazan refineries have been rendered inoperable, with repairs expected to take months due to a lack of specialized parts, exacerbated by sanctions.
- Supply Chain Disruption: The Druzhba pipeline was also struck, causing a temporary shutdown and raising concerns in Central Europe.
- Economic Strain: Russian energy firms face reduced revenues, strained profit margins, and increased dependence on government bailouts.
Strategic Context:
- Targeted Campaign: The strikes are a coordinated effort by Ukraine’s intelligence services (GUR and SSU) to dismantle Russia’s energy infrastructure, which they view as a crucial economic engine for its war efforts. [4, 5, 6]
- Shift from Previous Ceasefire: This intensified focus on oil facilities marks a departure from a previous understanding that limited mutual attacks on civilian energy infrastructure. [5]
- Economic Warfare: By targeting the oil sector, Ukraine aims to cripple Russia’s wartime finances and force a slowdown in oil production. [4]
Consequences:
- Soaring Fuel Prices: Wholesale gasoline prices have surged sharply, with AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline prices reaching record highs in August 2025. [3, 7]
- Market Instability: The ongoing disruptions and the financial strain on energy companies are reflected in underperforming stock valuations for firms like Rosneft and Gazprom. [2]
- Russia’s Vulnerability: The attacks highlight the fragility of Russia’s centralized energy infrastructure and expose its struggles to protect against deep-penetration drone swarms. [2, 8]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[6] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/19/world/europe/ukraine-russia-energy-infrastructure.html
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aG2W7-50iig
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The Cost to Russia of its War with Ukraine
The figure of $172 billion is Russia’s projected military expenditure for 2025, not a total cost to date, and represents about 8% of its GDP. While this isn’t a specific “war cost,” the Russian war in Ukraine has other significant economic consequences, including substantial direct military spending, which may have exceeded $132 billion through 2024 and reached over $450 billion by some estimates, along with broader economic costs like GDP losses and long-term effects on the economy. [1, 2, 3]
Breakdown of Costs and Projections:
- 2025 Military Expenditure: Russia’s planned military spending for 2025 is around $170-$172 billion, accounting for approximately 8% of its GDP. [1]
- Direct Military Spending: Some estimates place Russia’s direct military spending on the war at $132 billion or more by the end of 2024. [2]
- Total Direct War Cost: One source indicates the total direct costs of the war for Russia have exceeded $450 billion, though this is a broader figure encompassing all direct expenses. [3]
- GDP Losses: Beyond direct military costs, Russia has also incurred significant losses to its GDP as a result of the war, with estimates for 2022 alone falling between $81 billion and $104 billion. [2]
Context and Broader Impacts: [4]
- Economic Impact: The war has led to Russia’s focus on a “war economy” that prioritizes military spending, which drives short-term growth but undermines long-term economic health.
- Labour Shortages: The increased militarization of the workforce contributes to severe labor shortages.
- Inflation: Wage growth in Russia has outpaced productivity, fueling inflation.
- Sustainability: This approach creates a narrow and brittle economic foundation, making Russia’s long-term economic trajectory unsustainable.
AI responses may include mistakes.
[2] https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2421-1.html
[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine
[4] https://www.visionofhumanity.org/russias-war-economy-growth-built-on-unsustainable-foundations/
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