Category Archives: Eurasia

FNS* – Russia steps up terror offensive with armed raid on mosque in Occupied Crimea :: khpg.org

08 Sunday May 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Fast News Share, Political Psychology, Russia, Ukraine

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Crimean Tatars had just ended their Friday prayers and were rounded up en masse. With no suggestion that anybody was suspected of an offence, the raid, by men with machine guns, can only be called an overt attempt to terrorize Crimean Muslims. This is not the first such act of primitive intimidation, with at least one of the previous occasions making it quite clear that the Russian occupation regime is targeting Crimean Tatars in general.

Source: Russia steps up terror offensive with armed raid on mosque in Occupied Crimea :: khpg.org – Reported May 7, 2016.

Commentary

The above cited article will go on to note the following: “Attacks on people who have just left Friday prayers is both intimidation and part of the mounting campaign by Russia as occupying force to treat Crimean Tatars as ‘extremists’. / 10 Crimean Muslims are currently in detention facing ‘terrorism’ charges for alleged involvement in an organization – Hizb ut-Tahrir – which only Russia and Uzbekistan have banned.”

“Hizb ut-Tahrir”?

From the top, Wikipedia’s description: “Hizb ut-Tahrir (Arabic: حزب التحرير‎ Ḥizb at-Taḥrīr; Party of Liberation) is a radical,[1] international, pan-Islamic political organisation, which describes its “ideology as Islam”, and its aim as the re-establishment of “the Islamic Khilafah (Caliphate)” or Islamic state. The new caliphate would unify the Muslim community (Ummah)[2] in a unitary (not federal)[3] “superstate” of unified Muslim-majority countries[4] spanning from Morocco in West Africa to the southern Philippines in East Asia.

From the military perspective promulgated by Global Security: “The group claims to be a political party that proceeds with nonviolent means and whose ideology is Islam. Its objectives are strictly political, and its main goal is to topple an existing regime to resurrect the caliphate with structures and conditions similar to the ones of early 7th century Islam. The proposed Islamic state will be responsible for transforming society in a united Ummah, and for spreading the word of Islam throughout the world. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects modern, secular state structures and democracy as things that are ‘man-made, humanly derived, and un-Islamic,’ and, therefore, it does not participate in any secular electoral processes. However, Hizb ut- Tahrir does not reject modern technology and its advantages.”

Russia and Crimean Tatars share a brutal history, much of it condensed in an article by Eric Lohr in the Religion and Politics blog (May 28, 2014):

If Russia and the Tatars are to get along, they will have to overcome not only the bitter legacy of the 1944 deportations, but also centuries of conflict. Russian Tsar Catherine the Great’s conquest of the Crimean Khanate in 1774 led to a mass emigration of Tatars to the Ottoman Empire that was encouraged by the new Russian authorities. Catherine then proceeded to distribute vast lands that had been used by Tatars for grazing to Russian, Ukrainian, German, and foreign nobles and farming communities. The Crimean war of 1853-56 spurred another mass emigration of Crimean Tatars. Memories of historical injustices run the other way too. During the three centuries when the Crimean Tatar Khanate was part of the Ottoman Empire (1478-1774), one of its primary activities was seizing captives from Russia, Ukraine, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and selling them as slaves in the Ottoman Empire and Middle East.

Lohr, Eric.  “Russia and the Crimean Tatars: The Burdens and Challenges of History.”  Religion and Politics, May 28, 2014).

In the present, Putin’s Era, labeling Russia’s overt investigation of the Crimean Tatar community and the brushing away of the Islamist taint linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir perhaps signals that disingenuous writing that would promote chaos, at least, if not evil outright under the guise of concern with liberation and human rights.

Suspicion of within-mosque association with Hizb ut-Tahrir might rightly call any number of authorities, Ukrainian no less than Russian, to alert and to action.  The same may not condone The Bear’s hamfisted and often suspect methods, but it may excuse them in the interest of further explicating political drifts and their strength within so many conflicted and conflict-creating communities within Russia and within the Russian “sphere of challenge” — defined by annexations, frozen conflicts, infiltrations, information warfare, etc. — redeveloped KGB-style by Vladimir Putin.

As regards the Russia-in-Crimea act of fascist assertion and intimidation in surrounding with police a presumably peaceful mosque (“Shimmer” always applies): where is and where was the crime?

Ukrainians (a lot more than Russians) will need to know who is modern, i.e., who has become accustomed to and positively willing to embrace a world adjusted beneath the umbrella of compassionate, practical, and tolerant secular law?

Ukrainians also may wish to know who is not modern, i.e., who would embrace and reconstruct the medieval world and worldview, the same that has been on bloody display in Syria since 2011?

Midway down the left sidebar of this blog comes a bit of Jewish advice to those who would for kindness or naivete abet the designs of those inclined toward intolerance, sadism, and willfulness:

Talmud 7:16 as Quoted by Rishon Rishon in 2004
Qohelet Raba, 7:16
אכזרי סוף שנעשה אכזרי במקום רחמן

Kol mi shena`asa rahaman bimqom akhzari Sof shena`asa akhzari bimqom rahaman

All who are made to be compassionate in the place of the cruel In the end are made to be cruel in the place of the compassionate.

More colloquially translated: “Those who are kind to the cruel, in the end will be cruel to the kind.”

Online Source: http://www.rishon-rishon.com/archives/044412.php

As Halya Coynash’s writing makes the rounds, the example of that with which this post was started and titled, one may wish to keep in mind post-Soviet Russia’s deeply feudal revanch under Putin’s guidance.  The “mafia state” — the same that supported the rightly deposed thug Yanukovych — has also a nationalist drive and a revived Russian Orthodox Church attached: for the want of its own greater aggrandizement and not a little criminality, Russia appears to believe it has cause to induce extremism — or more extreme response — in the path of its own habitual imperialism.  

As with the delinquent fireman who sets the fire that he can put out, Russia’s state game appears to involve creating the problem (as with the incubating of ISIS in Syria) that its own “heroic” self might solve — an evil design, for sure, but if it has worked so far, and for Russia, so well, lol, in Syria, may God let it not take off in Crimea.

The method worked at least once (upon a time) in Somalia.

Additional Reference

ADC Memorial.  “Representative Body of Crimean Tatars to be Banned by Russian Law Enforcement.”  March 3, 2016:

If the symbolic attributes of Mejlis are banned, uncertainty will prevail concerning the use of the flag of Crimean Tatars. The latter is not a symbol of Mejlis, but of all Crimean Tatars. It is used by Mejlis to represent the community’s identity.

“The decision to ban Mejlis for alleged “extremist activities” may open the way to a massive wave of prosecution of Crimean Tatars for whom Mejlis is a symbol of struggle against century long repressions,” – said Karim Lahidji, FIDH President.

Knott, Eleanor.  “What the banning of Crimean Tatars’ Mejlis Means.”  The Atlantic Council, May 2, 2016.

*FNS: “Fast News Share” — BackChannels may be using the WordPress application “Press This” to swiftly share items of interest to its readers.

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Books – Agnia Grigas Tours Putin’s Neo-Imperial Russian Revival

06 Friday May 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Russia

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Russia’s information warfare vis-a-vis the Baltic States has centered on its own interpretation of Soviet history, smearing Baltic governments and societies as fascists and Nazis, and creating propaganda about alleged abuse of the Russian minorities.  The prominence given to these matters has ebbed and flowed.  However, since Crimea’s annexation in 2014, the narrative of discrimination against the Russian minorities has intensified.  The propaganda has served to reinforce Russia’s soft power efforts to create a network of co-opted communities of compatriots in the Baltic States as well as sow societal ethnic divisions.  The goal has been to encourage Russians and Russian speakers (but not only these) to develop loyalty to modern-day Russia, including its interpretation of history and current events.

Grigas, Agnia.  Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.  P. 62.  New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016.

Where Putin goes about the business of growing Russia back to Soviet size, at least in presence and as much in body as it may persuade, Agnia Grigas counts and examines the ways.  Covered in depth: Ethnic Russian and Russophone-based (and often disingenuous) compatriot and humanitarian policies, frozen conflicts, information warfare (including within near abroad states the development of Moscow-controlled media), “passportization” (instant citizenship based in nominal ethnic and linguistic affiliation), separatism, civil conflict, and annexation.

In the course of her writing, Grigas captures the spirit of Putin’s revanchist script that is bound to glorify, sanitize, and revive the past while keeping himself at the center of the universe so projected.  Of greatest interest to lay Kremlin watchers may be the many explications of historically near Moscow-engineered lies and manipulations recounted throughout the book.

BackChannels happens to have a page open detailing “a campaign that contributed to the 2007 riots by Russians and Russian speakers in Tallinn.”  The incident appears to have been less about “bending and twisting it some” and more about outright fabrication and incitement:

According to Estonian perceptions, Moscow was instrumental in inciting unrest and discontent by spreading false accounts in the Russian-language press that the monument, and presumably the nearby tombs of unknown soldiers, had been destroyed . . . The Russian embassy allegedly also took part in organizing the riots, while Russian activists, including members of the Nashi pro-Kremlin youth movement, traveled from Russia to take part in the violence. (p. 164).

That’s one incident recounted on one-third of a page — and the book runs 256 pages before the recounting of each chapter’s copious notes.

The Winter Olympics at Sochi and the dreadful fracturing of Syria may not be so unique, for Russia appears to have had plenty of experience at managing and putting on a show — and controlling information and perception in spaces it either exploits or would wish to exploit.

In her  concluding chapter, Grigas notes, ” . . . Russian compatriot policies go hand in hand with coercion, disinformation, and use of force against the governments of the target states.  These policies at times verge on blackmail to manipulate the compatriots and even allies like Armenia Belarus, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan into participating in the Russian reimperialization project.  Moscow offers and extends its protection to compatriots in some cases despite the preferences of the compatriots themselves” (p. 243).

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FTAC – Russia’s Not So Appealing Turn in Syria

06 Friday May 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, FTAC - From The Awesome Conversation, Russia, Syria

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In the bloody theatrical production that has been “Assad OR The Terrorists” — and guess who’s responsible for casting “The Terrorists”? — Russia and Syria, who have ejected the terrorists from Palmyra, have turned to assert the values of their feudal aristocracies against the barbarism of their foes. http://www.nytimes.com/…/syria-russia-palmyra-isis…

While classical music may set the tone of a better deal, the larger picture sustains political absolute power over “the masses”, an affront and challenge to the democratic and deeply humanist character of those the Russian Federation has chosen to label as its enemies.

***

Posted to YouTube May 5, 2016.

If the reader has no memory, then the reader may obtain one of two possible impressions: civilization, as represented by the symphony, is “winning” in Syria; civilization, as represented by the aftermath of an air strike against a refugee camp, is losing in Syria, and only barbarism is winning across that godforsaken land.

The truth has finer points.

In recent weeks, despite Russia’s promised pullback from Syria, Russia has instead strengthened its presence in the embattled state.

In early April, according to Fox News’s Lucas Tomlinson, Russia moved significant manpower and machinery towart Palmyra under the cover of demining the area.

Today, CNN’s Fred Pleltgen weighed in with an inventory of Russian assets associated with the military base at Latakia.

Moscow’s Line

By strengthening Moscow’s hand in Syria, Putin may be firming up Assad’s perception of Syria as a Russian client state after all.  As argued repeatedly on this blog, the true axis appears to be “Moscow-Tehran” and the purpose of it the sustaining of feudal absolute power enabling both imperial ambitions and further unrestrained kleptocracy.

Perhaps symphonies play louder than murder in so many state-controlled presses, but in the Open Source Environment, the same may be juxtaposed in a timely manner with the slaughter of noncombatants that would appear to secure their stay in service to the feudal aristocracies that appreciate them.

Also, the upgraded Russian military and political presence in Syria may leverage Washington into compromising with Moscow over Damascus in the control of situation.  Given the horrors of the “Syrian Tragedy”, the ancillary humanitarian and political fallout that coalesces around refugee camps and mass migration, western resistance to the feudal program(s) on display may stand diminished and neither Moscow nor Tehran changed very much if at all.

Additional and Cited Reference

Barnard, Anne.  “Airstrikes in Syria Kill More Than 30 in Refugee Camp.”  The New York Times, May 5, 2016.

Kramer, Andrew E. and Andrew Higgins.  “In Syria, Russia Plays Bach Where ISIS Executed 25.”  The New York Times, May 5, 2016.

Pleltgen, Fred.  “Russia flexes its military might in Syria.”  CNN, May 6, 2016.

Schearf, Daniel.  “Analysts: Russia Cynical on Syria, Goal is International Prestige.”  Voice of America, May 5, 2016.

Tomlinson, Lucas.  “Video of military convoy new evidence Russia not pulling out of Syria.”  Fox News, April 2, 2016.

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Russia’s Disinformation History – Elements

01 Sunday May 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Philology, Political Psychology, Russia

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Of BackChannels’ several inventions in political psychology, the “Paranoid Delusional Narcissistic Reflection of Motivation” might apply best to President Putin’s way of looking at western liberalism, developing cause to consider it threatening, and then, at last, accusing the west of possessing his own true motives as regards political control through disinformation, force, and manipulation.

For history, start with Czar Nicholas III’s “Okhrana“, the political secret police tasked with influencing and shaping the Czar’s own opposition — Ayatollah or Emperor, why not play both sides of the chessboard?  The political theater is either yours or it’s not — prove it’s yours: put on a play; give the opposition its head; slip it a script; settle back and enjoy the show.

On BackChannels, that line has been applied to “Assad or The Terrorists” AKA “Assad OR The Terrorists.

Dang if it hasn’t worked!

Of course, there’s more to the story of Russia’s romance with autocracy, state-controlled information and the perversions that are disinformation and propaganda, and secret political police.  What follows on this post is an afternoon’s brief compilation of articles pertinent to the challenge posed today by Putin’s approach to throwing the wool over so many eyes, including, possibly, his own.

In general, the Russian media portrays anything going on from the point of view of Vladimir Putin. He has unlimited access to the media and they explain everything that’s going on according to his official statement. It doesn’t really matter if it’s a war in Syria or any other topic.

Gordts, Eline.  “Putin’s Press: How Russia’s President Controls the News.”  The World Post, The Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute, October 24, 2015.

Russia today is the first intelligence dictatorship in history. It is a brand new form of totalitarianism, which we are not yet familiar with. Now the KGB, rechristened FSB, is openly running Russia.

Ion Pacepa in an interview with Blaze Books as reported by Benjamin Weingarten in The Blaze, February 10, 2014, citation included in reference.

BackChannels also possesses in its library a small “Russian Section” that boasts many volumes on the Russian experience in the 20th Century, on the Soviet, and on the transition from the Soviet to “Putin’s Kleptocracy”.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, its people had a unique opportunity to also cast off the country’s political police, that peculiarly Russian instrument of power created by the 16th century’s Ivan the Terrible, which had changed its name many times, from Okhrana to Cheka, to GPU, to OGPU, to NKVD, to NKGB, to MGB, to MVD, to KGB. Unfortunately, the Russian people were not yet ready — or able — to seize that opportunity.

Pacepa, Ion Mihai.  “Brand-New Russia, Same Old Disinformation.”  National Review, November 8, 2014.

The international community faces serious challenges arising from a new mode of information warfare, which Russia has deployed during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014-2015. This ongoing “propaganda war” is the most recent and frightening example of information warfare. It reflects the wide array of non-military tools used to exert pressure and influence the behaviour of countries. When skilfully combined, disinformation, malicious attacks on large-scale information and communication systems, psychological pressure, can be even more dangerous than traditional weapon systems, since they are extremely difficult to discover and combat.

Veebel, Viljar.  “Russian Propaganda, Disinformation and Estonia’s Experience.”  Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2015.

The Kremlin’s disinformation campaign goes far beyond controlling its own media. It is aimed at nothing less than presenting a parallel version of reality and disseminating it as if it were news. The Kremlin’s goal is to make people question the value of media at all; to reject the idea of an absolute truth; and to persuade the public that “reality” is relative.

Emerson, John B.  “Exposing Russian Disinformation.”  Atlantic Council, June 29, 2015.

If someone—some lost, ersatz-port-begotten ghost—materializing before me at that moment, had told me that, thirty years later, I would be writing about Andropov’s death in English, in America, on the week when post-Soviet Russia’s ruling class—made up, to a considerable extent, of the old K.G.B. cadre—would be celebrating the hundredth anniversary of his birth with a large exhibit dedicated to his life, at whose opening a glowing telegram from his spiritual successor, President Vladimir Putin, would be read—well, I would have known for certain that I had finally and irrevocably, once and for all, lost my mind.

Iossel, Mikhail.  “The Night Andropov Died.”  The New Yorker, June 17, 2014.

As a former KGB officer and head of the KGB’s successor agency, the FSB, Putin knows the value of information. His concept of the media, however, is a far cry from the First Amendment. For him, it’s a simple transactional equation: Whoever owns the media controls what it says.

“There should be patriotically minded people at the head of state information resources,” Putin told reporters at his 2013 annual news conference, “people who uphold the interests of the Russian Federation. These are state resources. That is the way it is going to be.”

Dougherty, Jill.  “How the Media Became One of Putin’s Most Powerful Weapons.”  The Atlantic, April 21, 2015.

Additional and Cited Reference

Applebaum, Anne and Edward Lucas.  “The danger of Russian disinformation.”  The Washington Post, May 6, 2016.

Abrams, Amanda.  “Fighting Back: New Bill Aims to Counter Russian Disinformation.”  Atlantic Council, March 17, 2016.

Bershidsky, Leonid.  “Primakov Would Have Run Russia as Putin Has.”  Bloomberg View, June 26, 2015.

Deutsche Welle.  “German media worries about Russian-led disinformation campaign.”  February 19, 2016.

Dougherty, Jill.  “How the Media Became One of Putin’s Most Powerful Weapons.”  The Atlantic, April 21, 2015.

Gilbert, Martin.  “Andropov and the Jews: The Five Blows.”  Viewed on Soviet Jews Exodus, reprinted from Jewish Chronicle, March 2, 1984.

Goble, Paul.  “15 Characteristics of Russian Propaganda.”  Stop Fake, April 18, 2016.

Goble, Paul.  “Hot Issues — Lies, Damned Lies and Russian Disinformation.”  The Jamestown Foundation, August 18, 2014:

Disinformation is always a conscious policy and part of a larger policy agenda. It is not simply dishonesty of this or that official in response to a particular event. It is implemented with a clear understanding that a combination of truth and falsehood is useful and effective. And it is pursued as long as it is effective, being sacrificed only when there are reasons to believe that either it is no longer necessary or it is no longer being accepted. All of those things have characterized Putin’s approach to information about Ukraine, a pattern that makes what Moscow is doing all the more disturbing.

Gordts, Eline.  “Putin’s Press: How Russia’s President Controls the News.”  The World Post, The Huffington Post and Berggruen Institute, October 24, 2015.

Iossel, Mikhail.  “The Night Andropov Died.”  The New Yorker, June 17, 2014.

Johnson, Alan.  “The Rehabilitation of Felix Dzerzhinsky.”  World Affairs, October 14, 2014.

Kofman, Michael.  “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts.”  War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016.

Luhn, Alex.  “European Union Prepares ‘Myth-Busters’ Team to Combat Russian Disinformation.”  Vice News, April 17, 2015.

Martosko, David.  “Exclusive: New book reveals how KGB operation seeded Muslim countries with anti-American, anti-Jewish propaganda during the 1970s, laying the groundwork for Islamist terrorism against U.S. and Israel.”  Daily Mail, June 25, 2013.

Pacepa, Ion Mihai.  “Brand-New Russia, Same Old Disinformation.”  National Review, November 8, 2014.

Schumann, Efim.  “Putin’s ‘secret sleepers’ waiting for signal.”  Interview with Boris Reitschuster.  Deutsche Welle, April 18, 2016.

Stop Fake.  “Russian Propaganda”.  Compilation of articles.

Weingarten, Benjamin.  “An interview with Lt. Gen. Ion Pacepa, the highest ranking Soviet bloc intel officer to ever defect.”  The Blaze, February 10, 2014.

Wikipedia.  “Active Measures”.

Wikipedia.  “Okhrana”.  The following comes from the “Pre-1905” section of the Wikipedia entry:

While P.I. Rachkovsky, as head of the Okhrana’s Foreign Agency, had long ordered Okhrana agents to infiltrate and influence revolutionary movements abroad, Zubatov brought these tactics to a new level by creating Okhrana-controlled trade unions, the foundation of police socialism.

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Posted to YouTube March 5, 2014.

Addendum – July 11, 2016 and Forward

Applebaum, Anne and Edward Lucas.  “The danger of Russian disinformation.”  The Washington Post, May 6, 2016.

Foster, Patrick.  “Kremlin-backed broadcaster RT offers Nigel Farage his own show.”  The Telegraph, September 7, 2016.

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Moscow Misrules – Create Chaos – Promise Order – Collect!

14 Thursday Apr 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Europe, Regions, Russia

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Posted to YouTube 6/22/2016.

Can you see the tree?  The trees?  The forest?

How about the blight?

Writing about Russia can be like that: Focus on a crime, follow it into more general corruption, arrive at the “mafia state”; overview energy and economics, move on to “hybrid warfare” and other aggressive military and paramilitary activities, and it dawns that there is an imperial state at work; have a glance at history, then get the nose out of the books and have a look around at present Putin & Co. relationships, disinformation, domestic information control, and global propaganda.

What may be most dangerous about Russia today is the slowly developing surround in alliance and axis accompanied by the seduction of the popular mind (in Soviet-speak, “the masses”) by way of the promotion of confusion.

For its part, this blog has pressed the idea that defending Putinism, much less spreading it, devolves to sustaining a deeply feudal-medieval worldview that in turn undergirds the power of state elites: the “New Nobility” that is the FSB; the “Vertical of Power” that is this most singular Russian President around whom other elements revolve; the Oligarchs that produce and enjoy the state’s wealth, albeit with a nod to the permit provided by their political mastermind.

From off that magnificent hub:

  • Putin-Assad-Khamenei (Putin-Khamenei);
  • Putin-Assad-Khamenei-Baghdaddi (together representing medieval absolute power);
  • Putin-Orban.

With numerous stolons — plant-generated surface and underground runners that propagate some of the species that use them — the Moscow hub appears to support an immense array of illicit and licit relationships.

Here’s a nugget pulled from the illicit bin, which, of course, is the one that most bothers the west:

The leaked files suggest that Roldugin is not keeping this wealth for himself, but is funneling the money to Putin’s inner circle, the reports say. Although Putin is not mentioned in the documents, he appears to be at the center of a web of Russia’s most influential and powerful men who owe their posts and fortunes to nothing but their friendship and association with him.

“It’s possible Roldugin, who has publicly claimed not to be a businessman, is not the true beneficiary of these riches,” the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists wrote. “Instead, the evidence in the files suggests Roldugin is acting as a front man for a network of Putin loyalists — and perhaps for Putin himself” (Mirovalev, LAT, April 4, 2016).

How deep go these relationships?

How many are there?

Can you see the tree?  The trees?  The forest?

The blight?

The Syrian Tragedy, as BackChannels refers to that horrific process in which it appears Damascus with tacit approval from Moscow and Tehran pursued a course certain to produce “The Terrorists” by preferentially bombing more moderate Free Syrian Army forces and refraining from curbing the early development of al-Nusra and ISIL, needs no introduction: the human spillover is either encamped or migrating all over the Middle East and Europe.

Posted to YouTube April 14, 2016.

Moscow, however, has been also busy from the Baltic Sea (as depicted in the above naval incident) to the Black Sea.  Crimea and Ukraine, Lithuania, and Moldova, among others moan with the impositions or threats posed by the phantom of the Soviet alive within the Russian Federation.

A note from Moldova (Timpul.md, February 11, 2015):

Given Moldova’s limited economic potential, the country struggles to maintain its defense capabilities. It only allocates 0.3% of its GDP for military purposes, which amounts to about 25 million dollars per year. Furthermore, Moldova presents limited interest to the West. Its strategic and economic importance is negligible. To make things worse, Moldova is highly dependent on Russian energy supplies, export and labor markets. Russian media control a significant share of Moldova’s informational space. Finally, Kremlin has been instrumental in using Russian speaking minorities in Moldova to advocate interest that often go against the will of the majority of the local population.

In earlier and Soviet years, Moscow was not above playing games to irk the west and possibly draw on its coffers and patience, for whom has always to pick up the pieces in the aftermath of so much meddling?  The BBC recently ran an audio clip featuring Somalia’s General Mohamed Noor Galal recounting the machinations that went into setting the course for war in the region between Ethiopia and Somalia known as the Ogaden.  In that misery, the Soviet enticed Somalia to invade the Ogaden and seize it from Ethiopia, and when Ethiopian forces were down on luck and firepower, it intervened to arm Ethiopia, which then recovered the Ogaden.

Somalia, however, has never recovered.

Whatever the Soviet was thinking — arms sales?  Expansion of forced influence? — it sure wasn’t thinking about the lives and needs of either either Ethiopians or Somalis.  In effect, in the promotion of the Ogaden War, The Bear wrapped an arm around the Somali leadership and offered to help the same acquire a fair patch of earth as redress for earlier grievance — and then with that accomplished, it did the same on the other side.

What works, unfortunately, works.

If you now see the Ogaden in history — you have seen one tree.

Nothing has changed: now as then, one may wonder at the character and mentality of the post-Soviet neo-imperial Russian leadership, the same that has treated Russia as it has other states: create chaos and danger, drown the masses in propaganda (ah, those good old Party days are here again!), and for power — and the protection of so many money making enterprises, licit and illicit — promise the super nationalist’s version of greatness, security, and stability.

Note: Putin-Erdogan — politically opposed (there’s that Shiite vs Sunni thing + NATO) but psychologically aligned (and Erdogan has the White Palace to prove it).

Reference

Akkoc, Raziye.  “Turkey’s president is not acting like a Queen – he is acting like a sultan’: Recep Tayyip Erdogan says he isn’t a sultan – rather he wishes to be like the Queen in a constitutional monarchy – but his actions suggest otherwise.”  The Telegraph, February 2, 2015.

Anadolu Agency.  “UN: No record of Russia humanitarian aid for Syria.”  February 4, 2014.

Balazs, Edith and Zoltan Simon.  “Orban Attacks EU Energy Plan as Putin Link Nets Hungary Gas Deal.”  Bloomberg, February 17, 2015.

Blair, David.  “Russia jets make ‘simulated attack’ on US warship in ‘aggressive’ Baltic incident.”  The Telegraph, April 14, 2016.

Farkas, Evelyn.  “Putin is testing Western resolve: Russian incursions into NATO airspace are evidence of Kremlin’s growing aggressiveness.”  Politico, November 25, 2015.

Farkas, Evelyn.  “Trump and Putin: Two liars separated at birth? — No wonder they seem to like each other; they are akin in their abuse of the truth.”  Politico, April 4, 2016.

Farkas, Evelyn.  “What the next president must do about Putin: An open letter from the Pentagon’s former key Russia expert on how to contain Russia’s aggressive autocrat.”  Politico, January 25, 2016.

Grigas, Agnia.  Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire.  New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2016.

Harding, Luke and Matthew Weaver.  “Barack Obama calls for ‘reset’ in US-Russia relations.”  The Guardian, July 7, 2009.

Jakóbik, Wojciech.  “Peter B. Doran: Atlanticism under threat.”  Interview. Stop Fake, March 30, 2016.

Loiko, Sergei L.  “A Russian horror story: Gang sentenced for 12 murders at family home.”  Los Angeles Times, November 19, 2013.

Melvin, Don.  “Girl asks Putin: Who’d you save from drowning, Erdogan or Poroshenko?”  CNN, April 14, 2016.

Mirovalev, Mansur.  “Putin’s best friend is at the heart of Panama Papers scandal.”  Los Angeles Times, April 4, 2016.

Political Capital.  “The Kremlin Connections of the Hungarian Far-Right.”  Stratfor, April 20, 2015.

Rettman, Andrew.  “Russian propaganda wins EU hearts and minds.”  Euobserver, June 23, 2015.

Shuster, Simon.  “A Failed Russia ‘Reset’ Haunts Obama in Europe.”  Time, June 3, 2014.

Stop Fake: Struggle against fake information about events in Ukraine.  Anti-propaganda website.

Than, Krisztina.  “Special Report: Inside Hungary’s $10.8 billion nuclear deal with Russia.”  Reuters, March 30, 2015.

Timpul.md.  “Moldova’s Security Options following Russian Aggression in Ukraine.”  February 11, 2015.

Traynor, Ian and Shaun Walker.  “Russian resurgence: how the Kremlin is making its presence felt across Europe: Moscow is influencing policy and shaping opinion all over the continent, with ties to both the far right and the hard left.”  The Guardian, February 16, 2015.

Walker, Shaun.  “‘So what if Putin is corrupt?’: Russia remains unmoved by offshore revelations.”  The Guardian, April 13, 2016.

Walker, Shaun.  “The luxury hotel, the family of the top Moscow prosecutor and Russia’s most notorious gang: Video by anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny links family of general prosecutor Yuri Chaika with wife of mobster behind notorious massacre.”  The Guardian, December 12, 2015.

Wolking, Matt.  “Six Years Ago Today: President Obama’s Failed Reset with Russia.”  Speaker of the House: Paul Ryan, March 6, 2015.

Xenakis, John J.  “World View: Mass Protests Force Moldova to Choose Between Europe and Russia.”  Breitbart, January 26, 2016.

Posted to YouTube January 26, 2016 (43:54).

Posted to YouTube May 9, 2014

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FTAC — A Wrap-Up on Mentality — Malignant/Medieval and Reparative/Modern Narcissism

11 Monday Apr 2016

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, FTAC - From The Awesome Conversation, Political Psychology, Politics, Psychology, Russia, Syndicate Red Brown Green

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In our common malignancy, perhaps, our narcissism lends repair to psychological damage to self concept. Life’s rough and in part insults us, less or more, but, again perhaps, the greater the insult to esteem — the heavier the hand — the more passionate the want of self-aggrandizement, security, and wealth.

In the healthy, it’s good having basic and somewhat above good circumstance in freedom, money, and general security. In the malignant, the same wants get Up There and Out There. On Back-Channels, I’ve likened such qualities to the recognized psychological pathologies that are bipolar disorder and narcissistic personality disorder. In our general political psychology and related sociology, we aspire and trade up in comfort and prestige, and we do that through laws an practices that accommodate a healthy general development with concern spanning the distance from penthouse to street.

The malignant do things quite differently.

Muammar Qaddafi’s Mullah Shweyga story (easily looked up) tells the difference. Such leaders take full advantage of the possession of the power to visit suffering on others with impunity. All of the crimes that may be visited on one may as well be extended to others: capricious “justice” or detainments, imprisonments, hangings, tortures. Each dictator asks: “who is going to stop me?” And off each goes into the high life on the backs of the hungry, the powerless, and vulnerable.

I’m always happy to share the Reuters piece on Khamenei (“Assets of the Ayatollah”), but I think it better that others embark on similar journeys as regards the entire host of figures whose power has proven malignant and resides in the brutalities and related fears and levers (e.g., bribery and patronage; intimidation and murder) known more to the medieval mind than the modern one.

Yes, this may be the only blog on earth suggesting the reader continue doing the research.

🙂

Here’s a related comment on Moscow’s role in managing conflicts in a manner fit to destroy those it manages to manipulate and prize from the same conflict-related income and, at least in its own hive-mind, power and prestige.

Moscow, representing Putin’s political police, himself, and the oligarchs, may be a greater power than Tehran. It may barely be keeping its political image clean — remember: officially, Moscow is helping Damascus fight “The Terrorists” — but it may have the habit of manipulating political situations to its advantage.

From Somali General Galal, who is still alive, here’s a densely compacted recap of the Somali vs Ethiopian war over the Ogaden: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03pk9c1

In the PROCESS of that war, Moscow apparently manipulated Somali leaders into laying claim or reclaiming the Ogaden, pitting first guerrilla then regular forces against Ethiopian control of the space. As advances pushed Ethiopia out of the contested space, Soviet Russia stepped in to arm Ethiopian forces, who then pushed back the Somalis. The Ogaden continues to host some related “low-intensity conflict”.

Who won?

Getting away from one’s own interests, in this instance Syria, and venturing to overview Moscow’s involvements in conflicts worldwide across time may help us more brightly resolve (accurately perceive) states of affairs in Syria and the Middle East Conflict.

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Links – On Russian Economic Disaffection

28 Monday Dec 2015

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Links, Russia

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The actions of the long haul truckers show this, she says, and others may follow. “What did the government do in this situation?” It made concessions that had the effect of showing that its earlier actions were “unjust” and should not have been taken in the first place. Russians can see that.

“Now, legislation should be very carefully considered, for numerous laws that have been adopted are putting additional burdens on business and on the population. “Unfortunately, in the government, they continue to accept laws” designed to extract more resources from the population and are imposing them to try to cope with the crisis.

http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2015/12/russia-may-be-close-to-revolution-but.html – 12/28/2015

The share of poor families in Russia—those with not enough income to buy food or clothing—in the past year has almost doubled from 22 percent to 39 percent, according to the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center.

https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/12/28/the-number-of-poor-families-in-russia-almost-doubles-in-2015 – 12/28/2015

Freedom, it so happens, carries with it a great many temptations and pitfalls, and no one among Russia’s powerful and propertied today has managed to resist these temptations. Impunity has made it impossible to cure Russia’s corruption with a simple outpatient procedure.

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2015/12/25/opinion-how-russians-became-radicals – 12/25/2015.

Twenty-four years and two days ago, the Soviet Union dissolved itself, a fact of political life and history that today places Putin, the oligarchs, the Russians, and the rest of the world in the 25th year past the monumental failure of the communist experiment.  Today’s apparent “experiment” in place of the last one: feudalism in the form of a medieval revanche harking back to the days of Nicholas II and his establishment of the grandaddy of Russian political police, the Okhrana.

Same old, same old — and the Russian People will bear the costs before the “New Nobility” does (the “Oligarchs” appear to have been already politically compromised, this according to a Dec. 10, 2014 piece by Masha Gessen in The New York Times).

In a possibly Orwellian turn of events, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, so pleasingly pardoned before the Winter Olympics at Sochi has been returned (by Putin’s regime) to the status of an accused enemy of the Russian state, and “arrested in absentia” (the courts and defense are starting to kick around the absurdity — although Putin denies involvement, the state’s reputation developed under his auspices undermines claims to forthright character, i.e., too much has taken place “behind the curtains”).

Addendum

In relation to the expansion of capricious justice in Russia comes this from World Affairs’ “Spotlight on Russia” by Vladimir Kara-Murza: “Putin ‘Outlaws’ European Justice in Russia” (December 24, 2015).

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FTAC – Post-Soviet, Neo-Feudal – Related Remarks of ISIS Defectors

24 Thursday Dec 2015

Posted by in 21st Century Feudal, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Islamic Small Wars, Politics, Russia, Syndicate Red Brown Green, Syria

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The Russian power model sustained by Putin today may hearken directly back to Tsar Nicholas II’s “Okhrana” — Russia’s original “political police”. There are a few books out on the topic, but the idea of infiltrating and co-opting the opposition (to the absolute power represented by the tsar) starts early, the transformation of some police into political agents channeling, derailing, or subverting protest would seem to have become inseparable from the standard operating procedures of today’s political Russia.

This is “cutting edge” as distribution of the PDF precedes the publication of a related book:

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Many nationalities are represented among the foreign fighters. “I have seen people from the USA, the UK, Germany, France, Russia, Chechnya, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Palestine [limited numbers]), Lebanon, China, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan,” Abu Jamal stated. He recalled that they were suspicious of the Russians. “We would consider them as agents because they were blonde, real Russian-blooded people and we would not trust them as they would mostly claim that they had been in the Russian Army and then converted to Islam and retired from their posts and came to fight for IS. They were also mostly military strategists and were making the plans for assaults and battles. They were effective on making strategic military decisions in IS.” Some of our informants wondered whether these Russians were plants (i.e. spies or agents), coordinating things with Assad’s forces.

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Source: Eyewitness Accounts from Recent Defectors from Islamic State: Why They Joined, What They Saw, Why They Quit by Anne Speckhard and Ahmet S. Yayla

The PDF is available online. Just search it up.

ISIS defector remarks dovetail nicely with the participation of Baathist Generals working with ISIS to plan assaults. The Soviet may have officially dissolved itself on December 26, 1991 but perhaps its methods have been sustained.

Media moves fast these days, and the sharing of information through the conflict and psychology community probably competes with the latest sports scores for rapid distribution.

The cause for ISIS suspicions regarding Russian convert-recruits certainly fits with the greater than century-long history of Russia’s political police elements.  How well present relationships may be traced is another matter, secrecy, of necessity, providing the foundations for every facet of conflict development and response (with perhaps the exception of making public the frank observations of terrorist defectors).

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