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It’s obvious that the US did the bare minimum in the fight for Ramadi. The list of targets destroyed by American air strikes reads like satire or gallows humor.

“Near Ramadi, seven airstrikes struck one large and five small ISIL tactical units and an ISIL IED facility, destroying four ISIL resupply structures, three ISIL fighting positions, two ISIL buildings, two ISIL heavy machine guns, an ISIL VBIED and an ISIL motorcycle.”

No artillery positions were struck, even though they ringed the city. None of the ten trundling Islamic State armored bulldozers were struck. No waves of Islamic State assault infantry were struck. My guess is that President Obama wants to simply run out the clock and leave this mess to his successor. He’s pretending to help, but our contribution is often worthless.

Wictor, Thomas.  “Without Resolve, All is Lost”.  Thomas Wictor, May 18, 2015.


“Anybody who supported the government will probably be executed within the next 24 hours,” said Baer. “Their families will be driven out. It will be a bloodbath over the next couple of days. All the soldiers who were captured will be executed.”

A flood of residents has been pouring out of Ramadi toward safer parts of Anbar and Baghdad in recent days.

“We are witnessing a humanitarian crisis,” said Haimour, estimating that as many as 8,000 people had left the city Sunday.

Mullen, Jethro.  “ISIS seizes key Iraqi city of Ramadi: What happens next?”  CNN, May 18, 2015.

Related, same day: Hoft, Jim.  “ISIS Holds Massive Military Parade in West Anbar Celebrating Victory in Ramadi . . . (Where’s the Coalition?).  Gateway Pundit, May 18, 2015.


US Secretary of State John Kerry said on Monday he was “absolutely confident” that the situation could be reversed within days.

Merthi, Karim Abou.  “Iraq forces eye swift Ramadi fightback before IS digs in.”  Yahoo News, May 19, 2015.


The way it looks for Ramadi, Sunnis, and Shiites in Iraq is not good.

The additional forces summoned by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi: Hashed al-Shaabi, Shiite “popular mobilization” units with a reputation for deeply seated Sunni-directed animus.  Merthi’s piece in Yahoo goes on to note, “Abadi and Washington had hoped to rely on regular forces and locally recruited Sunni tribal fighters newly incorporated into the Hashed al-Shaabi to fight IS in Anbar.”

In light of de facto black-and-white divisions in perception — for some (to many) in some spaces, one is either a this or a that, choose a label, and not to be noted for the better qualities of one’s more essential humanity — political habits may pit “all against all” (and some simply spoil for the Great Shiite vs Sunni War) when and where “all for all” is essential to forestall the march of the tyrannical.

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