Lunev, Stanislav and Ira Winkler. Through the Eyes of the Enemy: Russia’s highest ranking military defector reveals why Russia is more dangerous than ever. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998.
What will be a surprise to the American people is that the GRU and KGB had a larger budget for antiwar propaganda in the United States than it did for economic and military support of the Vietnamese. The antiwar propaganda cost the GRU more than $1 billion, but as history shows, it was a hugely successful campaign and well worth the cost. The antiwar sentiment created an incredible momentum that greatly weakened the U.S. military.
But our instructors kept stressing that just because the Americans lost did not mean they were in total decline. America, they sad, was becoming much more aggressive and a danger to civilization because it would have to reassert itself as a world power and avenge its defeat. For this reason, no matter who or what our targets, we were always to prioritize America.
There was also the GRU Special Center for the training of terrorists at GRU headquarters. The KGB provided financial and communications support to terrorists, but the operational training and support was reserved for the GRU. The GRU has trained terrorists from almost every country in the world, including Iraq, Libya, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Italy, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and Latin America. Where no terrorist groups existed in countries inimical to the USSR, the GRU would help to form them, and then provide them the necessary training, funding, and organizational support. So, for example, while the terrorists involved in the World Trade Center bombing may never have attended the GRU training, the GRU was responsible for the formation of the terrorist group that they belonged to.
Wherever one finds oneself as regards the “Open Source Intelligence” (OSI) community and, here on BackChannels, “Political Spychology“, the reading with a jaundiced eye, an appropriate skepticism, serves generally to strengthen claims when it comes to Russia’s Soviet Era intelligence history, its outlook, and its political operations. For example, elements out of “The Russian Section” of the in-house library keep showing up across volumes compiled independently and over time by numerous authors.
Lunev’s book has a bit of Bondish fun in it, as when he claims to have hitched a ride on the undercarriage of a train across a river to meet a Chinese source (China, for Moscow, had been at the time Enemy Number Two for intelligence trawling) — and never mind his beating up the thieves who greeted him when he rolled off on the opposite bank.