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Observed: similarity between Blinken and Pompeo’s articulation of Washington’s support for Ukraine despite the stark differences owned by their respective bosses, Trump and Biden.

From the Awesome Conversation


Stable governance associated with democracies needs must have purpose and vision greater than the length of any given Administrator’s tenure. With relation to East-West Conflict and Washington’s stance, I’ve come to believe that Putin’s Moscow has come to represent a retrograde feudal enterprise revolving around its “great leader” and his monopoly on political power that much includes the dark “mafia state” side and its association with “frozen conflicts” and numerous dictatorships. Given that perspective, and Washington’s now lowered but still present interest in “truth, justice, and the American way” — just boil the BS down to “Integrity” — the shield set before Putin’s darker and older world requires a canny reinforcement before any western demonstration of brute physical strength.

In effect, our conventional and nuclear weapons have created a world in which the potential costs of war far exceed the prospects of profit for winning. That may leave the majors “flicking” and “trading punches” (like brothers) while working other cultural and financial maneuvers to expand their footprints (e.g., Russia’s “passportization” of its “near abroad”) or cultural longevity and relevance (more China’s game at this time).

To the side and regarding Nordstream 2 — or, for that matter, Turkish Stream: Putin has succeeded in reverting a portion of EU/NATO to the feudal mode in spirit or fact. I would consider Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Turkey compromised democracies x leadership or x mafia and related internal politics, but I think Germany more robust and capable of discouraging Putin’s sense of mission to this point.

Finally, and regarding Crimea and the region north, Russia has entrenched itself militarily and produced a major bridge (2018, I think) for solidifying its invasion through trade between Crimea and Russia IF it can boost control of basic services (water first) and economic development.

The Vikings often arrived with “raid or trade” in mind.

Not much has changed.


Kerch Strait Bridge, 2018.

One may expect Russia to defend its investment, now that it has raised its own ante, in Crimea, but it will have to do that through its own development and trade and not with further theft.

Ukraine’s history with Russia has its deeply interwoven aspects in relation to political control in Kiev, but if history has been rough, it has perhaps been most abysmal for Ukraine in the 20th Century and left its mark with the Holodomer associated with Stalin.

Last week, Putin fixed his image as both the most daring and fragile of malignant narcissists. The eyes of the world were on him and the ambiguities attending his demonstration, positioning, and rehearsal for the conventional wholesale invasion of Ukraine in a manner befitting medieval war with the world most modern and devastating weapons, including the thermobaric “Mother of All Bombs”. We may thank God for the apparent but well watched “return to base” of so many forces minus a few tanks (were they that expensive to move back?). ๐Ÿ™‚

Well, bridges make a difference, don’t they?

They are never one-way streets.


Related Online

Dickinson, Peter. “All roads lead to Ukraine in Putin’s global hybrid war.” Atlantic Council, January 5, 2021.

Meyer, Christoph. “Europe has no excuse for letting Russia surprise it again.” Politico, April 21, 2021.

Smith, Hannah Lucinda. “They Cheered Russian Rule. Now Some Have Buyer’s Remorse.” The Atlantic, June 18, 2019.

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