It is a co-ed school about 45 miles south of Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state, and difficult to communicate with because extremists last year destroyed the cell phone tower there.
“Dark space” has nothing to do with color, race, creed, religion: it has to do with communicating and policing.
Any location without reliable 24/7 cellular communication becomes an easy target for marauders — and these most barbaric and sadist of Muslims, so they claim that status for themselves, prove the worst of marauding gangs.
Reactive tactics and strategies fail just as reliably as cell service.
Show business — shows of force, state public relations — won’t work either, and so far plainly hasn’t.
But, how do we encourage security agencies that refuse to use intelligence information sent to them by citizens or fail to coordinate intelligence information from various security outfits and government agencies?
Recently, a fellow gave sensitive information to a policeman on some suspicious activities within his workplace but the policeman waved it aside that even if he tells his boss, the officer will not trust his information or may accuse him of belonging to Boko Haram. Now how do we encourage the government or security services when a junior policeman does not have confidence in his superior officer?
Nigeria’s army may be brave, but as much as it may request weapons, what it needs most is a locked tight loyal intelligence service, one capable of tracing financing and arms sales, detecting related cabal and traffic in planning, and knowing, not guessing, where its enemy wanders.
In the backs-of-beyond, whether the remote corners of Columbia-Ecuador, the Durand Line separating Afghanistan from Pakistan, or the remote villages of Nigeria, producing structural changes may prove the most expensive but necessary response to a force now roaming and killing at will: cell systems, forts, roads, helicopter pads, airfields — all of it: and then, as too often demonstrated in Pakistan, mere police, even a barracks full of them, simply will not stand off a force superior in numbers for the 30- to 45-minutes it may take to lose a firefight while waiting for “backup”.
Opposite that tack: as refugees spill in from affected areas, they are doing defense naturally: fleeing the death for the safety of great numbers and improved state response to attack.
Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops.
“It would appear that they have established bases in certain parts of the northeast that nobody can even penetrate or go to, and they’ve excluded every symbol of authority in those areas,” he said. “Some even say they are in control of various local governments in the northeast and are collecting taxes and running the show in those places.”
Boko Haram’s Funding Remains ‘Elusive’ – 5/22/2013.
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“Boko Haram came in at about 4.00 a.m. (0300 GMT), just when we were getting ready for the morning prayers,” said Bama resident Abba Masta, who lives near the palace.
“There was shooting everywhere and they set the palace on fire. Many died. Students had to run for their lives as they attacked the government girls college as well.”
It was one of several deadly attacks this week.
Related: NCTC.gov – 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar, n.d.
When a government asks “Islamists” to lay down their arms (say “Pretty Please”?), it may do so with faith in reason, but better with these to have faith in the savagery that drives and the greed and lust that ensures their continued swimming in blood and money.
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