His criticism of Luhansk and its corrupt, thuggish, and authoritarian Regionnaire authorities has remained unsparing. They’re easy to lambast and deserve every bit of his ire. Luhansk suffers from a rust-belt economy, collapsing social services, unhealthy living conditions, and a particularly sedentary Regionnaire elite.
Related: Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin: Ben Judah: 9780300181210: Amazon.com: Books — Published June 2013.
Post-Soviet and Eastern European scholar and political science professor Alexander J. Motyl comments on Russia’s co-evolving dissenting political competition with his take on “Proctologist” blogger Stanislav Tsikalovsky, whom he predicts will climb the web vine up into a local political career between five and ten years from now.
I’m less certain of what to make of the nom de blogging guerre “Proctologist” except to note the scatological relationship to “Pussy Riot” and the potential for Putin’s Russia to develop an entire generational legion of brothers and sisters in virtual arms and mutual contempt for what they will perceive as the ethical and moral failings of a regime to which they may relate as moral avatars and otherwise disenfranchised outsiders.
The worse it gets, the worse they’ll get would be my prediction. Even so, my impression is such a development may not have much room for maneuver as Putin’s post-KGB FSB organizes defensively in relation to them.
Related: http://proctolog.blog.top.lg.ua/ (I like the slogan: “Believe me, for the crazy always tell the truth”).
Related: Truth and Hopelessness in Luhansk | World Affairs Journal – 3/30/2012.
Related: Auk Nr. 8 Clip (PIT No. 8) – IMDb – video trailer, posted in 2010.
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Names! Dropped with exclamation marks in Backchannels!
Honorably mentioned with an exclamation mark:
I will try to be more careful with exclamation marks! — now that I see so many of them in one place in relation to related subjects.
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Perhaps not with “Blueberry Hill”, I wonder if Putin could not play Carnegie, setting in his autocratic wake a plethora of great homes and monuments that over time might integrate the greater Russian tapestry. In that the rich, however they may have gotten there, believe the world should serve them, they may realize they have the obligation to spend it some. Locally. Regionally. Nationally.
Or face taxes.
I jest today.
The emerging oligarchy is not Romanov, and its basis for being rather seems to twine with feudal national building: why not control the initial engines and outflows of the post-Soviet economy to one’s own temporal advantage but also to create an influential class — that “new nobility” — from varied quarters, including old school chums?
Metals and banking tycoons Vladimir Potanin and Mikhail Fridman, who made their fortunes in the 90s, are still high on the list of Russia’s richest men. But the past decade saw a rise of new billionaires who draw their wealth from state contracts and some of whom are known to be the presidents’ friends, like Gennady Timchenko.
It reads awfully unfair, but that’s today’s news, not next generation’s news.
For a few Russians, there is a “gilded age” — their own. What they amass, what they build, what they leave by way of constructive investments spells the fortunes of an era to come.
However he has done it, Putin has organized a state, and that being so, he has given his emerging political competitors a lot to work with.
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Related on the vicissitudes attending wealth and noblesse oblige:
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