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And here we are in 2015 choosing to believe the promises made by the leaders of Islamic Iran regarding nuclear proliferation despite the well-known Islamic policy of taqiyya-religious deception. Despite the fact that they have lied about their nuclear programme in the past. From the Qur’an – This verse tells Muslims not to take those outside the faith as friends, unless it is to “guard themselves” against danger, meaning that there are times when a Muslim may appear friendly to non-Muslims, though they should not feel that way.” (Here And here – “And they (the disbelievers) schemed, and Allah schemed (against them): and Allah is the best of schemers.” If Allah is supremely deceitful toward unbelievers, then there is little basis for denying that Muslims are allowed to do the same. (See also 8:30 and 10:21) and here. From the Hadith: Bukhari (84:64-65) – Speaking from a position of power at the time, Ali confirms that lying is permissible in order to deceive an “enemy.” In other words, the word of a Muslim leader is not his bond.

Bederman, Diane Weber.  “Western Arrogance may lead us to Armageddon.”  Canada Free Press, July 16, 2015.


The vast majority of countries on Earth with nuclear programs do not possess sensitive nuclear facilities. Rather the fuel is provided by a more advanced nuclear power, such as Russia, France, or the United States. This eliminates the need for the spread of dangerous enrichment or reprocessing programs to new countries. Countries like Iran that insist on developing their own sensitive technologies for “peaceful purposes,” therefore, are tipping their hand and revealing a likely intention to build the bomb.

Kroenig, Matthew.  “Why is Obama Abandoning 70 Years of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy?”  Tablet, June 15, 2015.


Whether nations or women deceived, Islam and several of the states most representative of it would seem to have a big credibility issue.  For Jews, perhaps others who have taken note, serious betrayal — and signal of the complete absence of compassion, conscience, and empathy — begins with the legend of the mass slaughter of the Banu Qurayza men and the barbaric enslavement of their wives and daughters.

Muslim critic and reformer Tarek Fatah has derided and rejected the authenticity of the Banu Qurayza legend for finding it execrable as any sort of example of morality while the “anti-Jihad”, in general, maintains the same as a potent symbol of the character of Islam.

Today’s skinny brings the tale of the imam who lied to betray his wife and woo another woman (K. M. Lessing) into conversion and marriage.

Same thing, isn’t it?

First, lie; then exploit the lie: to get the woman; to get power over others.

From simple mass slaughter and the abuse of women inveigled into relationships, Islam’s apparently inherent interest in the possession of absolute power — unanswerable, unconscionable (well demonstrated throughout the Syrian theater and the military and political play that has been fashioned as “Assad vs The Terrorists”), and humanly conflated with the presence in concept of God Almighty — extends logically to the possession of nuclear arms and the associated ability and evident intent to threaten the annihilation of others in exchange for their cooperation, loyalty, obedience, subjugation.

Should one take it on faith that not all imam are like K. M. Lessing’s imam?

Similarly, should on take it on faith that not all ayatollah and senior clerics are like Ali Khamenei or Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?  Or the Muhammad who allegedly slaughtered 800 self-surrendered, compliant, and disarmed fathers and sons?

What do the polls say?

Where are the social science measures of attitudes toward others from within Islam?

Here we are back at “Shimmer“.

It’s different today: the question had been, as stated by Daniel Pipes, “How Many Islamists?”  Now we’re being positioned to ask among the despotic and theocratic leaders of Islamic states, who else (in addition to Pakistan) will have nuclear weapons, how soon, and how many?

While it may be understood that the Religion of Peace contains the genuinely peaceful and now an emerged leadership complement of Islamic humanists, social progressives, and reformers, its other faces retain the power and punch of military generals and political autocrats, and those in Iran it appears the west may now be rewarding with increased access to capital and the further encouragement of license exceeding all limits.

Loosely Related Reference

Afshari, Ali.  “Khamenei preaches Shiite-Sunni unity against Islamic State, US.”  Al-Monitor, October 22, 2014: “High-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic have always talked about the importance of Shiite-Sunni unity and even dedicated a week each year to the issue. Their actions, however, have served to deepen the Shiite-Sunni divide, in particular their discrimination against Iranian Sunnis, including limitations on their religious activities, as well as efforts to propagate Shiism in the Middle East.”

Al-Muslimi, Farea.  “Yemen’s Houthis proxy, not ally for Iran.”  Al-Monitor, November 19, 2014.

BackChannels.  “Ali Khamenei and the Letter from Near Mosul — A Speculation.”  January 16, 2015.

Bender, Jeremy.  “Iran’s proxy war in Yemen just got exposed.”  Business Insider, May 1, 2015.

Council on Foreign Relations.  “The Sunni-Shia Divide.”

Daoud, David.  “Iran’s Khamenei Says US is Enemy to Both Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Middle East.”  The Algemeiner, May 18, 2015.

Frantzman, Seth J.  “20 Myths About the Iran Deal.”  Terra Incognita, July 15, 2015: “How a country that hangs people proudly and burns the flags of those it negotiates with has come to be so respected on the international stage is truly extraordinary. It is a testament to the soft racism of low expectations of the West.”

Karami, Arash.  “Iranian supreme leader doubles down on struggle against American ‘arrogance'”.  Al-Monitor, July 13, 2015


In September 2014, the U.S. began airstrikes in Syria that targeted ISIS, allowing Assad to perform an “economy of force“: Assad left the U.S. to attack ISIS in the east and focused on the moderates in the west. Assad has worked very hard to make extremists the face of the insurgency—for example between ISIS’ emergence and late 2014, Assad directed just six percent of his airstrikes against ISIS—and to present this as a binary choice between the dictator or the takfiris; this is a lie, but many believe it and it has worked to make the U.S. effectively Assad’s (Iran’s) air force in Syria.

Orton, Kyle.  “America Not Training Syria’s Rebels Isn’t “Failure”; It’s Policy.”  The Syrian Intifada, July 13, 2015.


Ross, Dennis.  “Iran Will Cheat, Then What?”  Time, July 15, 2015.

Starr, Barbara.  “Sources: Baghdadi may have been in Raqqa.”  CNN Politics, July 15, 2015.  Post includes video, story, and photo panel of “Leaders of deadliest terrorist groups.”


Former U.S. officials and Iran experts say Khamenei has a deep-rooted suspicion of the West and a streak of insecurity – he rose to power due to his loyalty to the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rather than lofty religious credentials.

A sense of inferiority has dogged him over the years and it would be especially important for Khamenei to be seen as not folding under Western pressure to reach an agreement, they said.

Zakaria, Tabassum.  “For Iran talks, trying to divine supreme leader’s intent.”  Reuters, April 13, 2012.


The United States pushed forward with a sanctions-based approach largely because key administration officials believed that sanctions strengthened the credibility and leverage of those who wanted to engage Iran, while preventing more violent actions by Israel. They insisted that such an approach best addressed the myriad long-term mutual interests shared by the United States and Iran. President Obama himself reached the conclusion that there were too few negative incentives to affect Iran’s internal calculus, particularly regarding mutual interests.

Marashi, Reza.  “The Political Psychology of Obama’s Iran Policy.”  Muftah, January 6, 2012.


Khalaji, Mehdi.  “No Voice of Reconciliation: Khamenei Targets the West.”  The Washington Institute, May 21, 2015.

The Soufan Group.  “TSG IntelBrief: Khamenei’s Challenges and Unease in Iran’s Power Structure.”  November 14, 2013.


There’s not much on the web as regards “political psychology, Khamenei.”

Perhaps BackChannel’s approach with “malignant narcissism” aligned with the “Syndicate Red Brown Green” feudalism and associated anti-Semitism / anti-Zionism / anti-westernism will fill the bill: I believe Khamenei’s interests continue to reside with the possession of political “absolute power”, capricious justice, piratical leadership, militarism expressed through “war by proxy” and the cultivation of Daesh as a Sunni-aligned foil for Iraq’s Shiite militia (advised by Revolutionary Guard), and the long-term survival of Sunni vs Shiite teleological rivalry and related hot conflict as stage-managed from Tehran.


World Nuclear Association.  “Nuclear Power in Iran.”  Updated May 2015: “After two years delay due to Iran’s reluctance to agree to returning used fuel to Russia without being paid for it, two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering both supply of fresh fuel for the new Bushehr nuclear reactor and its return to Russia after use. The Russian agreement means that Iran’s nuclear fuel supply is secured for the foreseeable future, removing any justification for enrichment locally.”

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