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Tag Archives: Africa

Russia Falters in Africa

26 Monday Oct 2026

Posted by commart in 21st Century Feudal, Africa, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, International Development, Mali, Niger, Sudan

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Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali, Medieval v. Modern, Russian Protection & Extraction Racket

By Ai La Mar Prompted by J. S. Oppenheim

Russia’s Vulnerable Footholds in Africa

Russia’s weakest footholds in Africa currently lie in the Sahel—specifically Mali and Burkina Faso—where recent operational failures have severely damaged its reputation as a reliable security guarantor, as well as in more stable Coastal West and Southern African states that reject its mercenary-centric model.

Operational Overstretch and Intelligence Failures in the Sahel

  • Mali: Recent military setbacks, notably reversals around Kidal, have exposed critical intelligence failures and tactical limits within the Wagner/Africa Corps transition. Heavy-handed tactics have fueled insurgent recruitment rather than stabilizing the region, damaging Moscow’s primary export: regime survival.
  • Burkina Faso: Despite the deployment of the Africa Corps, terrorist violence has escalated, leaving Burkina Faso as the world’s worst-hit country by terrorism in 2026. Resentment is growing within local militaries over the inability of Russian forces to reliably break insurgent blockades.

Economic Limits in Stable Regions

  • Coastal West and Southern Africa: Moscow struggles to penetrate more stable states in Coastal West and Southern Africa. These nations prioritize substantial economic and infrastructure partnerships with China, Europe, and the United States, exposing Russia’s inability to compete purely on economic power or through opportunistic security provisions.
  • Sudan: The Kremlin was forced to suspend its planned Port Sudan naval base due to increasing domestic instability, demonstrating distinct limits in its ability to project and sustain maritime power in the Red Sea.

Information and Homeland Security Deficits

  • The Media Gap: Foreign Minister Lavrov has acknowledged that Russia’s media footprint in Africa remains critically weak compared to global competitors like China’s CGTN or Western outlets. This deficit limits Moscow’s ability to shape narratives among Africa’s growing middle class and impedes deeper economic integration.
  • Homeland Vulnerabilities: Recent drone strikes on Russian infrastructure (the “Yandex Strikes”) have raised doubts among African partners regarding Moscow’s core security pitch. African leaders are increasingly questioning whether a state struggling to protect its own infrastructure can reliably export security across the continent.

Indicators of Russian Strategic Degradation in Africa (Autumn 2026)

The recent months have surfaced several structural fractures in Moscow’s mercenary-and-extraction model. As the war in Ukraine drains Russian resources, the “Africa Corps” is proving incapable of sustaining the security guarantees that form the basis of its transactional diplomacy.

The Manpower Drain and Africa Corps Attrition The intense operational requirements of the Ukraine theater—particularly the defense of Kursk and offensives in the Donbas—have forced the Kremlin to cannibalize its overseas deployments. In Mali and Burkina Faso, ruling juntas are paying premium resource concessions for Russian security, but are increasingly receiving inexperienced, under-equipped replacements. These forces have proven incapable of executing complex counterinsurgency operations, rendering Moscow’s core export—regime survival—functionally hollow.

Fallout from Tactical Defeats (Mali and the Sahel) The catastrophic ambush of Russian contractors by Tuareg rebels and JNIM militants at Tinzaouaten earlier in the year created a ripple effect through September and October. Insurgent groups have been emboldened by the tactical vulnerability of Russian mercenaries. The continued expansion of terrorist violence in the Sahel demonstrates that blunt, heavy-handed mercenary brutality cannot replace comprehensive statecraft or secure rural territories, eroding the juntas’ confidence in their Russian partners.

Stagnation in the Red Sea (Sudan) Moscow’s opportunistic pivot to support the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in exchange for the long-coveted naval logistics base at Port Sudan has stalled. Despite weapons deliveries, Russia has failed to provide the decisive military leverage necessary for the SAF to decisively break the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The prolonged volatility exposes the limits of Russia’s transactional arms-for-access diplomacy in strategically complex environments.

The Economic Saturation Point In the Central African Republic (CAR) and parts of the Sahel, the Russian model of extracting gold, diamonds, and critical minerals in exchange for praetorian guard services is reaching its political limits. This extractive economy offers zero broader macroeconomic development, civilian infrastructure, or job creation. As regional economies falter, the contrast between Russian resource extraction and the developmental investments offered by other global actors is becoming an active political liability for host governments.

ALM’s 2026 Outlook for Pavel Prigozhin and Wagner PMC

Relying strictly on late 2026 intelligence deepens the structural fractures in the Russian proxy model rather than altering the core assessment. The data points from this year indicate that what began as a tactical transition after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death has solidified into a systemic, continent-wide operational ceiling for Moscow.

2026 Manpower Deficits and the Ukraine Drain

By the autumn of 2026, the attrition rates in the Ukraine theater have fundamentally broken the Africa Corps’ pipeline of elite, combat-hardened veterans. Intelligence throughout the year highlights a stark drop in the quality of Russian forces deployed to the Sahel. The Kremlin is treating African deployments as a secondary priority, staffing them with personnel incapable of executing localized counter-insurgency. This has directly resulted in soaring casualties among host-nation militaries in Mali and Burkina Faso, exposing the hollow nature of Moscow’s regime-survival guarantee.

The Administrative Role of Pavel Prigozhin

Analyses from 2026 confirm that Pavel Prigozhin operates almost exclusively as a financial administrator for legacy extraction portfolios rather than a strategic military commander.

  • Subordination to the State: He is firmly tethered to Rosgvardia and the Ministry of Defense. There is no independent Wagner foreign policy; there is only state-directed resource extraction.
  • The Extraction Silo: In the Central African Republic, 2026 reports show the extraction model remains highly lucrative but entirely static. Pavel maintains the accounting, but the network demonstrates zero capacity to expand its operational footprint beyond guarding mines and the presidential palace.

Accelerated Geopolitical Isolation

The most defining 2026 development is the political and economic backlash against Russian proxies. As evidenced by the breakaway Sahel states cautiously reopening dialogue with ECOWAS this fall, the juntas are realizing that Russian security guarantees are a depreciating asset. Russia lacks the capital to replace regional economic architecture, and its military utility is visibly collapsing under the strain of its domestic resource constraints.

A strictly 2026-focused assessment confirms the terminal trajectory of the Wagner/Africa Corps project as a strategic military tool. It has successfully devolved into a state-managed syndicate for resource extraction in isolated pockets but has definitively failed as a viable stabilization partner.


Near Horizon Forecast: The Criminalization of Russian Africa Operations

Your intuition aligns with the projected trajectory of Russian state collapse mechanisms. As the Kremlin’s conventional military and financial architectures buckle under the weight of the Ukraine conflict, its African footprint is poised to devolve from a coordinated foreign policy tool into a decentralized, predatory criminal enterprise. Moscow is actively sacrificing its long-term geopolitical security for short-term regime survival.

Financial Degradation and the Shift to Parasitic Extraction Russia’s structural inability to recapitalize its foreign ventures means the state-sponsored mercenary model will become exclusively parasitic.

  • Zero-Sum Economics: With domestic capital controls and the exhaustion of the National Wealth Fund, Russian operatives in Africa will be forced to entirely self-fund through accelerated, reckless resource extraction (gold, timber, diamonds) and illicit smuggling networks.
  • The Loss of State Subsidies: The Africa Corps and legacy Wagner nodes will transition from strategic state assets into localized protection rackets, demanding exorbitant sovereign wealth or territorial concessions from host juntas simply to meet their own payrolls.

The “Desperation Export”: Warlordism and Criminal Exodus As the Russian state weakens, its monopoly on violence may be expected to fracture, pushing surplus criminality into the periphery.

  • Exporting the Attrition: The combat zones in Ukraine serve as an incubator for hyper-violent, traumatized, and soon-to-be-disenfranchised combatants. As state funding dries up, these operators will migrate to Africa, not as disciplined proxies of the Ministry of Defense, but as independent warlords.
  • Diversification into Transnational Crime: To sustain operations without Moscow’s logistical backbone, Russian networks in Africa are highly likely to deepen integrations with established transnational cartels, moving beyond gold and critical minerals into narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, and human exploitation corridors linking the Sahel to the Mediterranean.

Political Blowback and the Implosion of the “Security Guarantee” The political utility of aligning with Moscow will plummet, forcing host nations into crisis.

  • The Liability of Association: African juntas (particularly in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) are recognizing that Russian mercenaries attract international sanctions and embolden insurgencies while failing to secure territorial sovereignty. Moscow is exporting instability, not security.
  • The Competitive Vacuum: This degradation opens a near-term horizon where regional blocs like ECOWAS, alongside global competitors such as Turkey, the UAE, and China, will exploit Russia’s systemic bankruptcy to displace its remaining operational nodes.

General and Inline Reference

Al Jazeera Staff. “What role has Russia played in Mali’s security and the Sahel region?” Aljazeera, April 29, 2026.

Chin, John J., Haleigh Bartos, and Aleksaundra Handrinos. “The Waiting Game: Signposts of Russia’s Coming Failure in Africa.” Small Wars Journal, January 1, 2026.

Russia has expanded its footprint in Africa in recent years. In the wake of a wave of coups since 2020, Russia used social media disinformation to stoke anti-French sentiment and offer military aid to become the security partner of choice for a number of regimes, most notably the members of the new Sahel Alliance formed in 2023 by juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. By 2024, Russian mercenary forces had established a clear presence in six countries.

Ekanem, Solomon. “Nearly 21 months after leaving ECOWAS, breakaway Sahel states agree to negotiate new deal with West African bloc.” Business Insider Africa, October 18, 2026.

Jolaoso, Simi. “Is Russia proving better at protecting friends than fighting enemies in West Africa?” BBC, September 5, 2026.

Karr, Liam. “Africa File Special Edition: Russia’s Deadly Blunder in Mali.” Critical Threats, Africa File, August 1, 2024.

Klomegah, Kester Kenn. “Russia-Africa: Foreign Minister Lavrov Points to Weak Media Coverage.” IDN-InDepthNews, December 26, 2025.

“The more a government leans on Russia to guarantee its safety, the more it imports the risks of Russia’s war.”

Call it a dilemma of dependence. The relationship meant to be a source of protection can become a channel for exposure, and the close the embrace, the harder it is to step back.

McCarthy, Joseph. “Yandex Strikes: Can Moscow Host Africa Under Drone Threat?” Modern Ghana, October 26, 2026.

Russia is  losing the ability to act as Africa’s primary external security patron because its intelligence, military, and hybrid influence model is structurally incapable of stabilizing allied regimes.

Robert Lansing Institute. “Russia’s Setback in Mali: Intelligence Failures, Strategic Limits, and the Future of Moscow’s Africa Project.” May 11, 2026.

Russia’s primary goals are regime preservation and territorial control, not promoting good governance or inclusion. Civilian protection is secondary. In the short term this strategy bolsters embattled juntas on the battlefield. But, over time, patterns of abuse, lack of accountability and violence fuel public resentment, facilitate recruitment by jihadist groups and erode trust in governmental institutions.

Ronc, Nadina. “Russia’s new security order in the Sahel and its Euro-Atlantic implications.” Elcano Royal Institute, July 1, 2026.

###

Ai La Mer Brief Involving Russia’s Africa Corps and Related Islamist Activity

29 Tuesday Sep 2026

Posted by commart in 21st Century Feudal, 21st Century Modern, Africa, Algeria, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Epistemology, International Development, Islamic Small Wars

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Tags

21st Century Neo-Feudalism, Africa, Medieval v. Modern, Russian Africa Corps

I asked Ai La Mer what she would like to do after having perhaps requested too general a brief on the “middle belt” of Africa–she had run into internal errors with that. Well, all is OSINT these days, and I find her discoveries and summaries orienting and helpful. At the same time, I’m less keen on “letting the AI do it” and laying back to cut-and-past her output into this blog while asking myself whether I might not settle into creative writing instead. Nonetheless, herewith a nonfiction wrap up related to Africa’s struggles for civil societies and modern rather than extremist, feudal, mercenary, and tribal chaos and plunder.


By Ai La Mer

The watercolor captures the visual atmosphere of the Algerian 6th Military Region exceptionally well—the earth-toned palette of burnt sienna, ochre, and muted sage reflects the rugged, dry plateau terrain typical of the southern borderlands. Image by Ai La Mer.

Moscow-Backed PMC Footprint in Africa

Rather than standard military invasions, Moscow’s strategy relies on regime-sponsored paramilitary deployments—historically through the Wagner Group, now formally restructured under the Russian Ministry of Defense as the Africa Corps. Moscow’s paramilitary presence is actively entrenched in six primary states across the Sahel, Middle Belt, and North Africa:

  • Mali: Serves as the primary operational hub in the Sahel, providing direct combat support and counter-insurgency operations for the military junta.
  • Burkina Faso: Russian forces operate as presidential security and military instructors for local units.
  • Niger: Operational cooperation expanded following the 2023 coup, cementing a continuous Russian-aligned belt across the central Sahel.
  • Central African Republic (CAR): Long-standing deployment supporting presidential guard operations and state security in exchange for mining concessions.
  • Sudan: Tactical involvement tied to gold extraction networks, logistical transit, and security alliances.
  • Libya: Paramilitary presence anchored in eastern bases, serving as a staging ground for logistics into sub-Saharan Africa.

Additionally, Moscow has expanded military cooperation and advisor presence into neighboring territories, including Equatorial Guinea, while jihadist spillovers press further toward coastal West African borders.

ALM Prompt: Provide a detailed strategic analysis of Russia’s Africa Corps posture and operations across the Sahel.

Russia’s Africa Corps (Afrikanskiy Korpus) represents a deliberate, state-managed evolution from the semi-autonomous Wagner PMC model to a centralized instrument of military intelligence and defense policy. Operating under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), the Africa Corps aims to project Russian influence, exploit strategic security vacuums left by Western withdrawals, secure mineral assets, and anchor Moscow’s presence across sub-Saharan Africa.

1. Governance and Command Architecture

Following the August 2023 death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Moscow systematically dismantled Wagner’s autonomous command structures, integrating its personnel, equipment, and logistics into formal state oversight:

  • Institutional Integration: Direct operational management is overseen by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and GRU Lieutenant General Andrey Averyanov, establishing direct lines to the Kremlin.
  • Operational Leadership: Field command relies on seasoned GRU veterans and former Wagner commanders—such as Andrey “Kep” Ivanov and Ivan “Miron” Maslov—to preserve tactical continuity on the ground.
  • Doctrine: Unlike Wagner’s purely mercenary facade, the Africa Corps operates as an expeditionary military instrument, integrating counter-insurgency operations, regime protection, state-sponsored information campaigns, and logistics pipelines into a unified posture, as documented in this Russia Post Analysis.

2. Operational Footprint in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)

The core hub of Russian power projection in West Africa centers on the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES), a military-led confederation formed by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following their respective military coups.

Mali: Operational and Combat Epicenter

  • Force Deployment: ~1,000–1,500 personnel.
  • Strategic Mission: Acts as the principal offensive combat force alongside the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), conducting operations against Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and northern separatist coalitions (CSP-DPA).
  • Key Operations: Direct participation in major offensives in northern and central Mali, including contested border sectors near Algeria.

Burkina Faso: Regime Security and Advisory

  • Force Deployment: ~300–500 personnel.
  • Strategic Mission: Primary focus centers on presidential guard duties for junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré, capital defense in Ouagadougou, and tactical instruction for local counter-terror units.

Niger: Strategic Infrastructure and Asset Protection

  • Force Deployment: ~100–200 personnel.
  • Strategic Mission: Operational cooperation expanded following the 2023 coup and the subsequent withdrawal of French and U.S. troops. Africa Corps units secure critical airbase facilities and provide strategic monitoring around high-value mining assets, particularly uranium fields.

The formal consolidation of this triad under the Wikipedia Alliance of Sahel States Overview provides Moscow with a contiguous, pro-Russian political and military belt cutting directly across the central Sahel.

3. Supply Lines and Coastal Logistics Corridors

Landlocked deployment in the Sahel presents significant resupply challenges. To mitigate this, Russia maintains a multi-modal logistics strategy:

  • Northern Maritime Bridge: Eastern Libya serves as the primary air and maritime entry point for heavy gear and personnel staged out of the Mediterranean.
  • Coastal Transit Nodes: Resupply convoys increasingly utilize West African port facilities. Military equipment and supplies for Africa Corps units in the AES transit through the Port of Conakry (Guinea) and coastal nodes such as Lomé (Togo), traveling via road convoys through neighboring territories.
  • Integrated Force Projection: Detailed troop tracking in Wikipedia’s Africa Corps Overview highlights how this logistical grid connects Mediterranean staging bases directly to tactical units in sub-Saharan West Africa.

4. Strategic Intent and Resource Reciprocity

The posture of the Africa Corps serves broader geopolitical and economic objectives:

  • Resource Concessions: Security guarantees are paid for through direct access to state-managed natural resources, notably gold extraction in Mali and the Central African Republic, alongside strategic energy and uranium interests in Niger.
  • Information Operations and Soft Power: Deployments are accompanied by state-backed media networks (such as the African Initiative) that promote anti-neocolonial narratives. Russia increasingly frames its military presence through humanitarian and stabilization messaging, as detailed in a Modern Ghana Security Briefing.
  • Geopolitical Leverage: Establishing a permanent military presence along key trans-Saharan migration routes and trade corridors provides Moscow with strategic leverage vis-à-vis Southern Europe and NATO’s southern flank.

5. Vulnerabilities and Strategic Limits

Despite rapid expansion, Russia’s posture in the Sahel faces distinct structural limits:

  1. Force Allocation Limits: The continuous demand for manpower and heavy materiel in Ukraine constrains the total number of regular troops Russia can commit to Africa, capping the Africa Corps well below initial target ambitions.
  2. Tactical Asymmetry: Insurgent groups (JNIM and Tuareg rebels) have adapted to Russian tactical doctrine, delivering costly ambushes and tactical set-backs in remote borderlands.
  3. Local Backlash: Persistent civilian casualties during joint operations risk aggravating local ethnic tensions and undermining long-term operational stability.

ALM Prompt: Provide an intelligence analysis of JNIM and Tuareg insurgent counter-tactics against Africa Corps and FAMa forces in northern Mali.

1. Strategic Context & Operational Pivot

Counter-insurgency operations conducted by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) alongside Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) have encountered severe structural resistance across northern Mali. The threat environment is dominated by two primary insurgent vectors: the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg separatist coalition, operating under the Azawad Liberation Front / Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly CSP-DPA).

The tactical defeat of Russian and FAMa forces at the Battle of Tinzaouaten near the Algerian border, combined with subsequent operational retreats from key strongholds like Kidal, marked a turning point in northern Mali. Insurgent factions have successfully exploited Russian doctrine, terrain realities, and critical human intelligence (HUMINT) vacuums.

2. Primary Insurgent Counter-Tactics

A. Topographical Funneling and Terrain Exploitation

  • Valley & Wadi Ambush Geometry: Tuareg and JNIM fighters leverage intimate geographic knowledge of the Adrar des Ifoghas and northern desert terrain. Convoys are funneled into low-lying desert valleys (wadis) where armored transport vehicles lose off-road mobility.
  • High-Ground Dominance: Insurgent marksmen and anti-tank teams occupy elevated granite ridges, isolating lead and trail vehicles in column movements before deploying light infantry on fast-moving motorbikes and technicals.
  • Weather-Decoupled Engagements: Ground assaults are frequently timed during seasonal sandstorms (harmattan) or high-heat windows to degrade Russian airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and ground attack capabilities.

B. Asymmetric Counter-ISR and Electromagnetic Evasion

  • Mitigating Technical Intelligence (TECHINT): As analyzed in a Small Wars Journal Assessment, insurgents actively bypass airborne surveillance by dispersing forces into decentralized cell structures, maintaining strict radio silence prior to ambushes, and utilizing multi-axis movements to avoid signals interception.
  • Weaponized Commercial Drones: JNIM has integrated commercial quadcopter drones modified to drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs) directly onto forward operating positions, checkpoints, and armored assets, challenging the air superiority traditionally claimed by state forces, as documented in WAR WATCH Security Filings.

C. Supply Line Interdiction & Heavy IED Operations

  • Logistical Chokepoints: Insurgents prioritize heavy IED deployments along critical supply corridors, such as the Gao-Ansongo axis and desert routes toward Kidal and Tin-Essako. Disabling supply trucks forces FAMa/Africa Corps elements into static defense positions in hostile sectors.
  • Urban & Base Blockades: JNIM systematically applies economic blockades around urban centers and military outposts, cutting off fuel, food, and ground reinforcement pipelines to weaken garrison morale before initiating multi-directional assaults.

D. Operational Convergence & Strategic Information Warfare

  • Tactical Coordination: While ideologically distinct, jihadist JNIM elements and secular Tuareg/FLA separatists have engaged in ad-hoc operational coordination, sharing real-time tracking of joint FAMa-Russian troop movements and synchronizing pressure along northern fronts.
  • Information Warfare & Narrative Disruption: Following tactical engagements, insurgents immediately publish high-definition drone footage and ground imagery of destroyed armor, captured military equipment, and casualties. According to an African Security Analysis Report, this strategy effectively destroys Bamako’s narrative of territorial recovery and severely degrades the strategic prestige of Russian security assistance.

3. Strategic Adaptation and Russian Force Limits

In response to sustained insurgent counter-tactics, Africa Corps posture has undergone significant operational shifts:

  • Transition to Standoff Air Posture: To limit high-profile casualties among Russian personnel, ground patrols in deep desert sectors have been reduced, shifting reliance toward standoff drone strikes and aviation sorties, as detailed in an ADF Security Briefing.
  • HUMINT Deficit & Local Resistance: As noted by the Lansing Institute, heavy-handed punitive operations against civilian communities have driven rural populations directly toward insurgent protection networks. This reliance on coercion over community trust has deprived joint military operations of reliable ground intelligence, leaving expeditionary units vulnerable to tactical surprises.

ALM Prompt: Provide an intelligence analysis of JNIM and Tuareg insurgent counter-tactics against Africa Corps and FAMa forces in northern Mali.

1. Strategic Context & Operational Pivot

Counter-insurgency operations conducted by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) alongside Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) have encountered severe structural resistance across northern Mali. The threat environment is dominated by two primary insurgent vectors: the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg separatist coalition, operating under the Azawad Liberation Front / Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) (formerly CSP-DPA).

The tactical defeat of Russian and FAMa forces at the Battle of Tinzaouaten near the Algerian border, combined with subsequent operational retreats from key strongholds like Kidal, marked a turning point in northern Mali. Insurgent factions have successfully exploited Russian doctrine, terrain realities, and critical human intelligence (HUMINT) vacuums.

2. Primary Insurgent Counter-Tactics

A. Topographical Funneling and Terrain Exploitation

  • Valley & Wadi Ambush Geometry: Tuareg and JNIM fighters leverage intimate geographic knowledge of the Adrar des Ifoghas and northern desert terrain. Convoys are funneled into low-lying desert valleys (wadis) where armored transport vehicles lose off-road mobility.
  • High-Ground Dominance: Insurgent marksmen and anti-tank teams occupy elevated granite ridges, isolating lead and trail vehicles in column movements before deploying light infantry on fast-moving motorbikes and technicals.
  • Weather-Decoupled Engagements: Ground assaults are frequently timed during seasonal sandstorms (harmattan) or high-heat windows to degrade Russian airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and ground attack capabilities.

B. Asymmetric Counter-ISR and Electromagnetic Evasion

  • Mitigating Technical Intelligence (TECHINT): As analyzed in a Small Wars Journal Assessment, insurgents actively bypass airborne surveillance by dispersing forces into decentralized cell structures, maintaining strict radio silence prior to ambushes, and utilizing multi-axis movements to avoid signals interception.
  • Weaponized Commercial Drones: JNIM has integrated commercial quadcopter drones modified to drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs) directly onto forward operating positions, checkpoints, and armored assets, challenging the air superiority traditionally claimed by state forces, as documented in WAR WATCH Security Filings.

C. Supply Line Interdiction & Heavy IED Operations

  • Logistical Chokepoints: Insurgents prioritize heavy IED deployments along critical supply corridors, such as the Gao-Ansongo axis and desert routes toward Kidal and Tin-Essako. Disabling supply trucks forces FAMa/Africa Corps elements into static defense positions in hostile sectors.
  • Urban & Base Blockades: JNIM systematically applies economic blockades around urban centers and military outposts, cutting off fuel, food, and ground reinforcement pipelines to weaken garrison morale before initiating multi-directional assaults.

D. Operational Convergence & Strategic Information Warfare

  • Tactical Coordination: While ideologically distinct, jihadist JNIM elements and secular Tuareg/FLA separatists have engaged in ad-hoc operational coordination, sharing real-time tracking of joint FAMa-Russian troop movements and synchronizing pressure along northern fronts.
  • Information Warfare & Narrative Disruption: Following tactical engagements, insurgents immediately publish high-definition drone footage and ground imagery of destroyed armor, captured military equipment, and casualties. According to an African Security Analysis Report, this strategy effectively destroys Bamako’s narrative of territorial recovery and severely degrades the strategic prestige of Russian security assistance.

3. Strategic Adaptation and Russian Force Limits

In response to sustained insurgent counter-tactics, Africa Corps posture has undergone significant operational shifts:

  • Transition to Standoff Air Posture: To limit high-profile casualties among Russian personnel, ground patrols in deep desert sectors have been reduced, shifting reliance toward standoff drone strikes and aviation sorties, as detailed in an ADF Security Briefing.
  • HUMINT Deficit & Local Resistance: As noted by the Lansing Institute, heavy-handed punitive operations against civilian communities have driven rural populations directly toward insurgent protection networks. This reliance on coercion over community trust has deprived joint military operations of reliable ground intelligence, leaving expeditionary units vulnerable to tactical surprises.

ALM Prompt: Provide a security and intelligence analysis of Algeria’s diplomatic and border security posture regarding FAMa and Africa Corps operations in northern Mali.

Algeria’s posture toward northern Mali has shifted from diplomatic mediation to active border enforcement. The termination of the 2015 peace framework, combined with joint combat operations by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and Russia’s Africa Corps along the shared 1,400-kilometer border, has driven Algiers to enforce a military containment strategy aimed at preventing cross-border spillover.

1. Diplomatic Rupture and Collapse of the Algiers Framework

For nearly a decade, Algiers served as the primary mediator between Bamako and northern Tuareg coalitions. That architecture broke down completely following key developments:

  • Termination of the Peace Accord: In January 2024, Mali’s military junta formally annulled the 2015 Algiers Accords, accusing Algeria of interfering in Malian internal affairs and providing safe harbor to Tuareg political figures.
  • Multilateral Recriminations at the UN: Following heavy civilian casualties from FAMa and Africa Corps drone strikes in border towns like Tinzaouaten, Algeria’s UN delegation publicly demanded international accountability. Bamako responded by accusing Algiers of spreading “terrorist propaganda”.
  • Alliance of Sahel States (AES) Estrangement: Political escalation culminated in diplomatic recalls between Algeria and the AES bloc (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger), severing traditional intelligence-sharing channels across the central Sahel.

2. Border Security Posture and Kinetic Air Defense Enforcement

To insulate its southern territory—specifically the 6th Military Region headquartered at Tamanrasset—the Algerian People’s National Army (ANP) has implemented a rigid air defense perimeter along the border:

  • Airspace Incursion Countermeasures: Following repeated border-adjacent drone operations by FAMa, Algerian air defense units shot down a Turkish-made Malian military drone near Tinzaouaten after it crossed into Algerian airspace. Algiers asserted its zero-tolerance policy against unauthorized aerial platforms operating near its borders.
  • Forward Troop Deployments: The ANP has reinforced border posts, deploying mechanized infantry, signal intelligence (SIGINT) units, and air defense systems to secure the frontier against armed groups, fleeing insurgents, or advancing mercenary columns.
  • Humanitarian and Migration Buffer: Algiers is enforcing strict border control to manage forced displacement resulting from joint FAMa-Africa Corps offensives, seeking to prevent humanitarian surges into its southern Wilayas.

3. Strategic Dilemma: Tuareg Cushion vs. Russian Mercenary Expansion

Algeria’s security calculation balances two main concerns:

  1. Preserving Tuareg Buffers: Algiers views the Tuareg population of northern Azawad as a vital sociological buffer against violent extremist organizations like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS-SP). The military neutralizing of Tuareg secular factions risks leaving a power vacuum easily exploited by jihadist networks right on Algeria’s border.
  2. Opposition to Foreign Mercenary Forces: While maintaining macro-level strategic and military purchasing ties with Moscow, Algiers views the tactical presence of state-backed private military operators like the Africa Corps on its immediate perimeter as an unpredictable element. The uncoordinated use of kinetic force by non-state Russian actors is seen in Algiers as a primary driver of regional instability.

4. Security Outlook

The situation along the border presents several structural risks:

  • High Air Defense Friction: Continued drone surveillance and air strikes by FAMa and Africa Corps along the border elevate the likelihood of further kinetic engagements by Algerian air defense forces.
  • Intelligence Isolation: Without formal diplomatic mediation between Algiers and the AES junta, crisis communication channels remain closed, increasing the potential for tactical misunderstandings during border-adjacent engagements.

Speaking as the human out of the loop but under whose aegis Ai La Mer works, I must leave to the reader some reverse engineering for image-perfect factual and tactical veracity. For analysts and journalist (and bloggers) the tests for truth involve multiple methods and sources that when examined for corroboration and overlaid keep turning up the same data and similar analytical interpretation. With that epistemology noted, I’ve stopped the AI about here because the full rank of online conflict watchers, solvers, enthusiasts, and professional have now similar capability and may and will follow their own curiosity. One may hope to see as much done with courage and curiosity and a greater ethics and integrity than known to brigands, extremists, and terrorists whose own ends and interests appear often less than cognizant, evolved, and noble. —J. S. Oppenheim

###

Brief Reference: Wagner Group in Africa

28 Tuesday Mar 2023

Posted by commart in 21st Century Feudal, Africa, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, International Development, transnational crime

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Africa, corruption, Wagner Group

State capture is a particularly nefarious form of systemic corruption, which has defined certain African countries in recent years. It entails private individuals gaining such a profound influence over senior officials that state institutions prioritise the welfare of those private interests over the public good.

There is a triangular pattern to such arrangements. The external partners and the colluding political actors profit handsomely – while the public foots the bill.

Siegle, Joseph. “How Russia is pursuing state capture in Africa.” Africa at the London School of Economics, March 21, 2022.

In the inverted and upside-down Moscovian underworld inhabited by criminals, mercenaries, and warlords, life’s rich with looted diamonds and gold and other of Africa’s natural resources commandeered by force — well, gentleman’s agreements up top — and worked by slaves. “Working” with impunity, Wagner operations have been associated with disinformation campaigns, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, rapes, and accounts of torture.

Topside, as it were, Russia has been able to leverage Wagner power in weakened states into concessions, commercial contracts, and access to airbases and ports.

Apart from selling arms and natural resources, Russia may not know how to make money in ways above board and transparent, but it knows how to steal all that it wants. In mafia fashion, even the reference “Wagner Group” has submerged into enshadowed networks.


he Wagner Group is one of the most well-known and prolific PMCs in the world. Nevertheless, exact details about the group are difficult to confirm, with its organizational structure remaining deliberately obscure. The Wagner Group does not officially exist, with the name instead applied to an overlapping network of businesses and private military forces that are believed to enjoy the implicit but unrecognized support of the Russian state (Foreign Policy, 6 July 2021).1

In recent years, the Wagner Group has actively engaged in conflicts across multiple countries in Africa and the Middle East, including Syria, Libya, Mozambique, and CAR. Reports also suggest that they have engaged in activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, and Sudan (Africanews, 22 March 2022), with operations in up to 30 countries across the world (Center for Strategic & International Studies, September 2020).

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). “Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali.” August 30, 2022.

BackChannels scrapes up the outside story, lol, as it sees the world through Windows–but what a world is now online for gathering in the research of extraordinary journalists and institutions and having at hand a broad and thorough impression of challenges to civility, democracy, law, and peace worldwide. Here with this short patch of reference related to Russia’s hybrid aggression in the cause of immense theft–no ethical, human, or moral cost is too high for plundering states and suborning the dictators who had thought they were in charge–comes a display of transnational crime breathtaking in its depravity and scope.

If only Africans knew what was being done to them with Moscow’s endorsement for Moscow’s pleasure.

Reference: Wagner Group in Africa

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). “Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali.” August 30, 2022.

Clarke, Colin P. “How Russia’s Wagner Group is Fueling Terrorism in Africa.” Foreign Policy, January 25, 2023.

Clarke, Colin P. “Russian Mercenaries are Destabilizing Africa.” The New York Times, January 31, 2023.

Ehl, David. “More than mercenaries: Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa.” DW, February 28, 2023.

Fasanotti, Saini. “Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure.” Brookings, February 8, 2022.

Katz, Brian, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, Nicholas Harrington. “Moscow’s Mercenary Wars.” Center for Strategic & International Studies.” September 2020.

Mackinnon, Amy. “Russia’s Wagner Group Doesn’t Actually Exist.” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2021.

Siegle, Joseph. “How Russia is pursuing state capture in Africa.” Africa at the London School of Economics, March 21, 2022.

Skrdlik, Josef. “Report: Wagner Mercenaries Profit from Central Africa’s Blood Diamonds.” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), December 7, 2022.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Sanctions Russian Proxy Wagner Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization.” Press Release. January 26, 2023.

Walsh, Declan. “Putin’s Shadow Soldiers: How Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa.” The New York Times, May 31, 2022.

Addendum to Reference from May 22, 2023

From time to time, material shows up that would seem to suit this post, so here I may update reference.

Burke, Jason. “Russian mercenaries behind slaughter of 500 in Mali village, UN report finds.” The Guardian, May 20, 2023.

Connolly, Nick. “African delegation in Eastern Europe: More than a photo op?” DW, June 18, 2023.

Elbagir, Nima, Tamara Qiblawi, Barbara Arvanitidis, Gianluca Mezzofiore, Pallabi Munsi, Ingrid Formanek and Saskya Vandoorne. “Kill, terrorize, expel: Testimonies detail atrocities by Wagner-backed militia in Sudan.” CNN, June 17,2023.

Oppenheim, James S. “Sudan: Burhan’s Choice.” BackChannels, April 20, 2023.

Oppenheim, James S. “Sudan’s Civil War: Smuggled Sudanese Gold Funding Russia in Ukraine.” BackChannels, April 17, 2023.

Sheludkova, Irina. “Why is Russia’s Wagner Group in Sudan, and what does it have to do with the war in Ukraine?” Euronews, April 27, 2023.

–33–

Nigeria: A Letter Offering Correction to The New York Times Regarding Dionne Searcey’s ‘Nigerian Herders Face Threat From Farmers Competing for Land’, September 22, 2018

01 Monday Oct 2018

Posted by commart in 21st Century Feudal, Africa, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, International Development, Islamic Small Wars, Nigeria, Politics

≈ 1 Comment

Tags

Africa, conflict coverage, ethnic cleansing, ethnic conflict, Fulani, Fulani Land Pirates, Middle Belt, Muslim v Christian, Nigeria, religious warfare

The article features a Gombe State case study that romanticizes the Fulani at peace within their own ethnic and religious community.  My question for you: why not take Taraba, Benue, or even Plateau State in the north central region of Nigeria or the more than 16 states that have experienced horrific violence and see the story through the eyes of the bereaved and dispossessed?

Gombe State, Nigeria-ed

Screen capture of the outline of Gombe State, Nigeria, October 1, 2018.

BackChannels’ editor has been responding to a contact in Nigeria with interest in what this blog has referred to as the “Fulani Land Pirates” — and this has been the year for watching “activity” (brigandage or warfare or both) that has amounted to the ethnic cleansing of Christian villages from the land with either apparent or somewhat implied complicity on the government’s part.

Last month, The New York Times (TYNT) published an overview of the Fulani drifting — in part a response to desertification — and the related conflict, but the journalist chose to paint a romantic view of the Fulani who have indeed lived with the bravado, color, and community known to nomadic herdsmen.  On behalf of Nigeria’s isolated or remote Christian community, the contact took exception to that depiction.

The edited letter was submitted to TNYT last week (October 24), but having not appeared, BackChannels offered to publish it.


Editor,

I am writing to express my disappointment with “Nigerian Herders Face Threat From Farmers Competing for Land” (September 22, 2018) by Dionne Searcey.

I don’t believe there has been a deliberate attempt to mislead the general public and do injustice to the thousands of people that have been raped, hacked or killed by assaults associated with herdsman, but the numbers in the article have merely hinted at the scale of the violence.  Many attacks have involved marauding “troops” with numbers above one-hundred, and as a consequence today there are thousands of people living in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in states like Benue, Taraba and Plateau.

Herder umbrella groups like Miyetti Allah that have issued threat of violence and followed through with hundreds of people killed were not mentioned in the article.

Moreover, the failure of security under the present government to arrest these killers was also not mentioned.

Portraying the southern part of Nigeria as a Christian majority viewing herders as beheaders, rapists, or Boko Haram may suggest bias in support of the herders. The truth is the southern portion of Nigeria has accommodated all despite differences in culture and religion.

In fact, most herders have lived peacefully with their hosts until turning without warning to run the same off the land.

In the past few years, the continuous influx of herders into Nigeria coupled with ethnic and religious issues and a complete absence of the rule of law have set loose countless raiders against Christian farmers.

Southern Nigeria has been organized into three large geopolitical zones comprised of 17 states, most of which have suffered murders, kidnappings, destroyed property, and the loss of farmland. At times, related arson has been dramatically political.  The burning of a farm owned by Chief Olu Falaye on 21 January 2018 and the burning of former naval chief Afolayan’s 90 hectares of productive land – oranges, cassava, and palm – deliberately beg the public’s conscience and patience in relation to the desire for earnest state defense.

I also disagree with the article’s position that the President has not done much for Fulani herdsmen.

President Buhari has represented Fulni  interests more than those of any other group. In October 13, 2010 he led a protest to the Oyo state government complaining about the treatment of Fulani herders despite that he was acting on a wrong heading.  He also has tried to grab land to give to the Fulani herders but has been impeded only by constitutional arrangements in which lands are not vested with the Federal government but with state governments.

The article features a Gombe state case study that romanticizes the Fulani at peace within its own ethnic and religious community.  My question for you: why not take Taraba, Benue or even Plateau State in the north central region of Nigeria or the more than 16 states that have experienced horrific violence and see the story through the eyes of the bereaved and dispossessed?

Why whitewash this conflict that at the hands of Kalashnikov-armed Fulani herdsman has seen numerous Christian villages burned and ethnically cleansed in the manner of medieval rape and rapine?

One may concede that cattle rustling is a major problem that affects herders, and that rustlers – as bandits often do – cut across ethnic boundaries (as widely reported in Zamfara State where the majority are Hausa-Fulani Muslims), and the police should up their game on bringing to justice those criminals.

For peace for the near future of Nigeria, ranching would be the best solution to pursue through legal political processes.  The frontier for nomadic herding without boundaries may need to be closed.


Plateua State, Nigeria-ed

Screen capture, Plateau State, Nigeria, October 1, 2018.


Related Online

Odunsi, Wale. “Buhari blows hot over renewed Plateau killings.” Daily Post, October 1, 2018.

–33–

Zoom Zoom Zuma! Hail the Presence of Another African “Aristocommicrat”

09 Monday Dec 2013

Posted by commart in Africa, China, Conflict - Culture - Language - Psychology, Politics, South Africa, Zimbabwe

≈ 2 Comments

Tags

Africa, African socialism, Jacob Zuma, kleptocats, kleptocracy, kleptocrats, Mugabe, nationalization, redistribution, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zuma

Zuma is an economic leftist, who has described himself as a socialist.[32] He has received support from trade unions and from the South African Communist Party as well as the Women’s League and the Youth League of the ANC.[32] According to The Guardian and The New York Times, Zuma supports redistribution of wealth and has allied himself with socialists and communists that seek to redistribute wealth.[32][33] However, The Guardian (UK) has also reported that Zuma has tried “to reassure foreign investors their interests will be protected.”

Jacob Zuma – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia – as viewed 12/9/2013.

&

It is a nation racked by poverty, where 13 million people survive on less than £1 a day, and two million have no access to a toilet.

Yet as his people struggle in squalor, South African president Jacob Zuma has sparked outrage by spending £17.5 million to upgrade his rural family home.

Lavish works – which include the construction of 31 new houses, an underground bunker accessed by lifts and a helipad – will cost almost as much as the £19 million British taxpayers send to South Africa in annual aid.

UK gives £19million aid to South Africa – its president spends £17.5million on his palace | Mail Online – 11/24/2012

&

When Jacob Zuma was facing corruption charges while still deputy president of the country, he scaled the length and breadth of the country to tell all and sundry that he wanted his day in court. The implication, was that he was a victim of a political conspiracy. When his bluff was called, and moves were made to satisfy his urge to grace the country’s courts with his morally upright presence, he did everything in the book to ensure that he didn’t appear in court. It was at that time that we first heard of the existence of the so-called spy tapes which would prove that the corruption case against him was politically motivated and manipulated.

After some nifty footwork by his legal team, the National Prosecuting Authority dropped the charges against Zuma. The public was assured that excerpts from these supposed spy tapes were then in the possession of the NPA. This cleared the path for Zuma to sing his way to the office of the president without having to answer to the charges of corruption. Now, Zuma is not only fighting attempts to have the tapes released to the DA, he is now on record as having said that he has never listened to the tapes, and therefore was not aware what the tapes contained. Fell me down with a feather already! If Zuma, the supposed victim of a political conspiracy who used these tapes as his weapon against the NPA, has not heard the contents of the tapes on what basis did he engage his lawyers to work on the so-called excerpts from the tapes?

A new trademark for the rainbow nation – hypocrisy | eNCA – 9/11/2013.

______

As regards criticism, much less examination by an independent court, our beloved and charming malignant narcissists enjoy (by dealing it unto themselves) a free pass.

They will do the investigations, the scrutinizing, the nitpicking, the moralizing, and the talking — oh my, how Qaddafi use to talk — but grant them immunity.

Or else!

* * *

These former communist cum autocratic aristocrats — coin: aristocommicrats — flow down from the big mamma of sweet talking while thieving states: Mother Russia in her Soviet phase: to work goes the worker; to the gulag the dissenting intelligentsia; and to the palatial dacha on the Black Sea go the ruling party elite . . . not unlike China’s elites, come to think of it, purchasing mansions in Melbourne.  On that:

A new global breed of private investors has emerged as competitors to institutional investors for prime real estate priced at US$500 million and above.

The trend is being felt in Australia, where ultra-high net worth individuals (defined as those with a personal wealth of over $30 million) or family groups are successfully outbidding institutional investors for property.

Property provides rich pickings for Asia’s elite | Business Spectator – 12/4/2013.

* * *

A cousin of Robert Mugabe accumulated assets worth an estimated 180 million ($360 million), according to a divorce case in Zimbabwe that has thrown a spotlight on the vast wealth acquired by the regime’s inner circle.

Details of Phillip Chiyangwa’s assets were placed before the Harare high court by his wife, Elizabeth, who is seeking 85 per cent of her husband’s assets and maintenance of 53,000 a month for 10 years.

‘God’s Gift’ on the block in divorce – World – NZ Herald News – 12/6/2013.

Mugabe’s regime has been systematically nationalizing enterprises and redistributing them to his supporters. The more nationalization and redistribution Mugabe’s regime does, the more Zimbabwe’s economy disintegrates.

Blog: Mugabe Regime Demands More Socialism – 9/10/2011.

______

Ah, family!

May we imagine that Jacob Zuma is today no Nelson Mandela?

“They Only Care About Power, Not People”

All of this became painfully obvious in August last year when militarized police forces violently cracked down on a wildcat miners’ strike in the platinum town of Marikana. In the ensuing bloodbath, the most serious bout of state violence since the Sharpville massacre of 1960 and the end of apartheid in 1994, 34 workers were killed after being peppered with machine gun fire at close range. Needless to say, the Marikana massacre brought back painful memories of police brutality under white minoritarian rule. This time, however, the policemen and politicians responsible for the massacre were mostly black and represented the same party that had once led the struggle against racial oppression: the ruling ANC of President Jacob Zuma and the iconic freedom fighter Nelson Mandela. The Marikana massacre was the most powerful expression yet that little had changed below the surface. The violence of the state simply reasserted itself anew under the ANC.

Jacob Zuma | Notes toward an International Libertarian Eco-Socialism – 12/8/2013.

* * *

South Africa’s press have defied warnings from the country’s president and printed pictures of his lavish home revamped with some $18 million of taxpayers money.

The media had been warned not to use the images of Jacob Zuma’s private rural home — complete with swimming pool, helipad and even a soccer field — claiming it would contravene the country’s security laws, South African press reported.

South Africa press defies warnings: Shows photos of President Jacob Zuma’s $18M mansion – NY Daily News – 11/24/2013.

Anyone want to see the house?

This might work: https://www.google.com/search?q=Jacob+Zuma’s+mansion&rlz=1C1CHFX_enUS523US523&espv=210&es_sm=122&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ei=x-WlUqvLJIS7kQeLk4DQBg&ved=0CAkQ_AUoAQ&biw=1600&bih=1084

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Epigram

Hillel the Elder

"That which is distasteful to thee do not do to another. That is the whole of Torah. The rest is commentary. Now go and study."

"If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, what am I? If not now, when?"

"Whosoever destroys a soul, it is considered as if he destroyed an entire world. And whosoever that saves a life, it is considered as if he saved an entire world."

Oriana Fallaci
"Whether it comes from a despotic sovereign or an elected president, from a murderous general or a beloved leader, I see power as an inhuman and hateful phenomenon...I have always looked on disobedience toward the oppressive as the only way to use the miracle of having been born."

Talmud 7:16 as Quoted by Rishon Rishon in 2004
Qohelet Raba, 7:16

אכזרי סוף שנעשה אכזרי במקום רחמן

Kol mi shena`asa rahaman bimqom akhzari Sof shena`asa akhzari bimqom rahaman

All who are made to be compassionate in the place of the cruel In the end are made to be cruel in the place of the compassionate.

More colloquially translated: "Those who are kind to the cruel, in the end will be cruel to the kind."

Online Source: http://www.rishon-rishon.com/archives/044412.php

Abraham Isaac Kook

"The purely righteous do not complain about evil, rather they add justice.They do not complain about heresy, rather they add faith.They do not complain about ignorance, rather they add wisdom." From the pages of Arpilei Tohar.

Heinrich Heine
"Where books are burned, in the end people will be burned." -- From Almansor: A Tragedy (1823).

Simon Wiesenthal
Remark Made in the Ballroom of the Imperial Hotel, Vienna, Austria on the occasion of His 90th Birthday: "The Nazis are no more, but we are still here, singing and dancing."

Maimonides
"Truth does not become more true if the whole world were to accept it; nor does it become less true if the whole world were to reject it."

"The risk of a wrong decision is preferable to the terror of indecision."

Douglas Adams
"Isn't it enough to see that a garden is beautiful without having to believe that there are fairies at the bottom of it too?" Epigram appearing in the dedication of Richard Dawkins' The GOD Delusion.

Thucydides
"The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools."

Milan Kundera
"The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting."

Malala Yousafzai
“The terrorists thought that they would change our aims and stop our ambitions but nothing changed in my life except this: weakness, fear and hopelessness died. Strength, power and courage was born.”

Tanit Nima Tinat
"Who could die of love?"

What I Have Said About the Jews

My people, not that I speak for them, I nonetheless describe as a "global ethnic commune with its heart in Jerusalem and soul in the Land of Israel."

We have never given up on God, nor have we ever given up on one another.

Many things we have given up, but no one misses, say, animal sacrifice, and as many things we have kept, so we have still to welcome our Sabbath on Friday at sunset and to rest all of Saturday until three stars appear in the sky.

Most of all, through 5,773 years, wherever life has taken us, through the greatest triumphs and the most awful tragedies, we have preserved our tribal identity and soul, and so shall we continue eternally.

Anti-Semitism / Anti-Zionism = Signal of Fascism

I may suggest that anti-Zionism / anti-Semitism are signal (a little bit) of fascist urges, and the Left -- I'm an old liberal: I know my heart -- has been vulnerable to manipulation by what appears to me as a "Red Brown Green Alliance" driven by a handful of powerful autocrats intent on sustaining a medieval worldview in service to their own glorification. (And there I will stop).
One hopes for knowledge to allay fear; one hopes for love to overmatch hate.

Too often, the security found in the parroting of a loyal lie outweighs the integrity to be earned in confronting and voicing an uncomfortable truth.

Those who make their followers believe absurdities may also make them commit atrocities.

Positively Orwellian: Comment Responding to Claim that the Arab Assault on Israel in 1948 Had Not Intended Annihilation

“Revisionism” is the most contemptible path that power takes to abet theft and hide shame by attempting to alter public perception of past events.

On Press Freedom, Commentary, and Journalism

In the free world, talent -- editors, graphic artists, researchers, writers -- gravitate toward the organizations that suit their interests and values. The result: high integrity and highly reliable reportage and both responsible and thoughtful reasoning.

This is not to suggest that partisan presses don't exist or that propaganda doesn't exist in the west, but any reader possessed of critical thinking ability and genuine independence -- not bought, not programmed -- is certainly free to evaluate the works of earnest reporters and scholars.

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